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Casenotes and Statute Notes
CIVIL PROCEDURE - PERSONAL JURISDICTION - Mere
purchases, even occurring at regular intervals, are insuffi-
cient as contacts and do not justify a state's claim of in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a
claim not related to the purchase transactions. Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
Four United States citizens died in a helicopter crash in
Peru on January 26, 1976.' Helicopteros Nacionales de
Columbia, S.A. (Helicol) owned and operated the helicop-
ter.2 Helicol is a Columbian corporation in the business
of providing helicopter transportation for oil and con-
struction companies in South America.3 Helicol's princi-
pal place of business is Bogota, Columbia.4 At the time of
the crash,5 Helicol was transporting the four United
States citizens, who worked for Consorcio,6 which was
constructing a pipeline for Petro Peru.7 Because of the
I Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1870 (1984)




Helicol's helicopter crashed into a tree in a fog, and all aboard were killed.
Brief for Respondents at 7-8, Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 104
S. Ct. 1868 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent]. The jury found
that Helicol's pilot had been negligent. Id.
6 Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1870. Consorcio is a Peruvian consortium, which is ajoint
venture of Williams International Sudamerica, Ltd., a Delaware corporation;
Sedco Construction Corporation, a Texas corporation; and Horn International,
Inc., a Texas corporation. Williams-Sedco-Horn is based in Houston, Texas, and
formed Consorcio because Peruvian law required construction of the pipeline to
be done by a Peruvian entity. Id. at 1870 n.l.
I Id. Petro Peru is the Peruvian state-owned oil company with which Consorcio
contracted to construct a pipeline from the jungles of Peru westward to the Pacific
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rugged terrain Consorcio needed transport into and out
of the construction area in Peru.8
A member of Consorcio contacted Helicol, asking
Helicol to send an officer to Houston, Texas, to negotiate
a contract.9 In addition to negotiating the contract in
Houston, Helicol had other contacts with Texas.' 0 Be-
tween 1970 and 1977 Helicol bought 80% of its fleet of
helicopters from Bell Helicopter Company in Fort Worth,
Texas." Helicol's purchases of equipment, parts and
services in Texas totaled approximately $4,000,000.12
During that time Helicol's pilots and maintenance person-
nel were trained in Texas.' 3 Consorcio's payments of
over $5,000,000 were drawn on a Houston bank and de-
posited in Helicol's New York and Florida bank ac-
counts.' 4  Helicol had no other contacts with Texas.' 5
The survivors and representatives of the four decedents
in question brought wrongful death actions against
Helicol in the District Court of Harris County, Texas.' 6
Helicol's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion was denied.' 7 Ajudgment of $1,141,200 was entered
against Helicol in favor of representatives of the
Ocean. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, 638 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tex.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Hall].
* Id.
* Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1870. Helicol had previously done business in South
America with Williams International, a member of Consorcio. Brief for Petitioner
at 3-4, Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
Helicol's chief executive, Francisco Restrepo, went to Houston for the contract
negotiations. Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1870. The contract stated, inter alia, that all the
parties were residents of Lima, Peru, and that all controversies arising out of the
contract would be dealt with in Peruvian courts. Id.
,o Hall, 638 S.W.2d at 870.




15 Id. at 1870-71.
16 Id. None of the plaintiffs or the crash victims were residents of Texas. Id.
Those bringing suit included the Hall family, the Porton family, the Lewallen fam-
ily and the Moore family. Brief for Respondent at 7 n.6. The Halls resided in
Arizona, the Lewallens in Illinois, and both the Moores and the Portons resided
in Oklahoma. Id. at 7 n.5.
" Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1871.
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decendents. 18 The court of civil appeals reversed the trial
court's judgment -and dismissed the case,' 9 holding that
Texas lacked in personam jurisdiction over Helicol.20
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court, ' holding that the Texas courts did have in personam
jurisdiction over Helicol. The Texas Supreme Court rea-
soned that Helicol's contacts with the state constituted
sufficient minimum contacts under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to justify the exer-
is Id. The plaintiffs also sued Consorcio and Bell Helicopter Company. Id.
Both defendants were granted instructed verdicts, and Bell Helicopter was
granted a directed verdict on Helicol's cross-claim. Id. at 1871 n.6. Judgment in
the amount of $70,000 was entered against Helicol in favor of Consorcio as cross-
plaintiffs. Id.
19 Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 616 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App. -
Houston [1st Dist.] 1981).
20 In personam jurisdiction (personal jurisdiction) used to be based on physical
power: unless a defendant was served with process while he was physically present
within the forum state, a court lacked the power to adjudicate a matter involving
that defendant. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE§§ 1064-1069 (1969). Currently the determination of the validity of the fo-
rum state's assertion of personal jurisdiction rests upon minimum contacts
between the state, the defendant, and the cause of action. See infra notes 42-54
and accompanying text; see also Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants,
69 VA. L. REV. 85, 93-95 (1983).
Jurisdiction in rem is distinguished from in personam jurisdiction in that a judg-
ment rendered by a court with in rein jurisdiction does not bind the defendant
personally. Comment, Developments in the Law: State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 909, 948 (1960). The basis for in rem jurisdiction is that a state has the
power to determine title to or status of property within its borders. Id. One com-
mentator stated, "[Tihe requirements imposed by the due-process clauses are
seizure of the res [thing] and notice to all who have or may have interests therein."
Id. at 949.
Another type of proceeding, commonly called quasi in rem, adjudicates the inter-
ests of certain known defendants, rather, than the whole world's interests in prop-
erty in the state. Id. An example of a quasi in rem proceeding is a bill to remove a
cloud on title, which determines interests in specific property. Id. In a second
type of quasi in rem action, the plaintiff has a personal claim against a nonresident
defendant, and any property the defendant may own in the state is attached and
brought within the court's jurisdiction. Id. The plaintiff may satisfy his judgment
out of the attached property. Id. Like in rem actions, the basis of jurisdiction in
both quasi in rem proceedings is the power of the state over a res situated within its
borders. Id. at 950. See also Lilly, supra; Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Oregon, 49 J.
AIR L. & COM. 399, 403 (1984).
21 Hall, 638 S.W.2d at 870. Initially, the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the
court of civil appeals, but on a motion for rehearing, the court withdrew its prior
opinion and reversed the appellate court, with three justices dissenting. Helicol,
104 S. Ct. at 1871.
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cise of personal jurisdiction over the company.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certio-
ran to decide whether the Supreme Court of Texas cor-
rectly ruled that Helicol's contacts with the state of Texas
were sufficient to allow it to assert jurisdiction over
Helicol, a foreign corporation, in a cause of action not
arising out of or related to Helicol's activities in Texas.2 3
Held, reversed. Mere purchases, even occuring at regular
intervals, are insufficient as contacts and do not justify a
state's claim of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporation in a cause of action not related to those
purchase transactions. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v.
Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1874 (1984).
22 Id. The Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas long-arm statute reaches
as far as due process permits. Hall, 638 S.W.2d at 872 (citing U-Anchor Advertis-
ing, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W. 2d 760 (Tex. 1977)). The statute reads in relevant part:
Sec. 3. Any foreign corporation. . . that engages in business in this
State, irrespective of any Statute or law respecting designation or
maintenance of resident agents, and does not maintain a place of
regular business in this State or a designated agent upon whom ser-
vice may be made upon causes of action arising out of such business
done in this State, the act or acts of engaging in such business
within this State shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment
Sec. 4. For the purpose of this Act, and without including other acts
that may constitute doing business, any foreign corporation . . .
shall be deemed doing business in this State by entering into con-
tract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to be performed
in whole or in part by either party in this State, or the committing of
any tort in whole or in part in this State. The act of recruiting Texas
residents, directly or through an intermediary located in Texas, for
employment inside or outside of Texas shall be deemed doing busi-
ness in this State.
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1984). The Supreme
Court of the United States stated it had no power to determine whether the
Supreme Court of Texas was correct in its interpretation of the state's long-arm
statute, so the Court accepted the Texas court's holding that the statute reached
as far as due process allows. Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1872 n.7. The issue before the
Court, therefore, was whether due process allowed the exercise ofjurisdiction
under these facts. See id. at 1871-72.
23 Id. at 1869-70.
1985] CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
I. HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION - NONRESIDENT
CORPORATIONS
A. Early Theories of Personal Jurisdiction
The American doctrine of personal jurisdiction has un-
dergone major changes throughout its history.24 The
traditional grounds for assertion of jurisdiction over de-
fendants originated in Pennoyer v. Neff,25 which was based
on the common law doctrines of presence and consent. 6
In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment operates to limit a state's power to assert in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.27  The Court
applied a mechanical "territorial power" theory of juris-
diction 28 that grants a court the power to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant only if he had been
personally served with process while physically present
within the boundaries of the forum state, or if he has con-
sented to that court's adjudication.29
After Pennoyer v. Neff, states asserted jurisdiction over
natural persons in four situations:30 first, where the de-
fendant's residence was within the forum;3 1 second, where
the defendant was in the forum when served; 32 third,
24 von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).
2-5 95 U.S. 714 (1877). For a more detailed look at the development of the
American law of personal jurisdiction and the history of the various doctrines, see
Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241 (1965);
Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of
State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958); Comment, supra note 20.
26 Comment, supra note 20. See also infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
27 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 733.
28 Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner; An End to Ambivalence injurisdiction Theory? 26 U. KAN.
L. REV. 61 (1977).
29 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 727.
30 Woods, Pennoyer's Demise; PersonalJurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest
Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARMz. L. REV. 861,
863 (1978).
S See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (out of state service of pro-
cess was valid where the absent defendant is domiciled in the forum state).
32 See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (jurisdiction
asserted over defendant served while flying in airspace above the forum).
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where the defendant consented to the forum's assertion
of jurisdiction;s3 and fourth, where the defendant owned
property within the forum which was attached before ad-
judication of the claim.3 4 Following Pennoyer v. Neff, states
were able to assert jurisdiction over domestic corpora-
tions as being "present" for jurisdictional purposes, or as
having "consented" to jurisdiction, or even as being
"domiciled" within the borders of the state that created
it.3 5 Courts, however, experienced difficulties in applying
this traditional territorial doctrine of jurisdiction to for-
eign corporations.3 6 Thus, courts began to assert jurisdic-
tion under their own theories.3 7
" See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (de-
fendants consented to jurisdiction of the forum state by agreeing to designate a
third person to receive process for them in that state).
34 See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 226 (1905) (asserting quasi in rem jurisdiction
over a debt owed to the absent, nonresident defendant), overruled in Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See also supra note 20 for an explanation of this
type of quasi in ren proceeding.
-1 Comment, supra note 20, at 919.
s Id.
37 Courts began to apply the consent to adjudication theory to nonresident cor-
porations. See Ex Parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 377 (1877) (jurisdiction as-
serted over foreign corporation because it consented to being "found" within the
territorial limits of the state as a condition to doing business there).
Theorizing that it was inconsistent to determine that a corporation which did
not exist except in its charter state could consent to be sued or bring suit (see Bank
of United States v. Devereaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809) (allowing a corpora-
tion in one state to sue a citizen of another state in federal court)), the New Jersey
Supreme Court held a court could assert jurisdiction over a nonresident corpora-
tion "doing business" within the forum. Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins.
Co., 25 N.J.L. 57, 60-61 (1855) (enforcing a judgment obtained against New
Jersey corporation in New York because the corporation had transacted business
in New York and the cause of action arose from the contract made there between
the parties).
Most states, however, continued to use the consent theory by restricting a for-
eign corporation's ability to do business in that state until the nonresident con-
sented to that forum's adjudicatory powers, whether or not the corporation
complied with the statute requiring it to appoint an agent. Pennsylvania Fire Ins.
Co. v. Gold Issue Mining.& Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917) (allowing the interpre-
tation of Missouri consent-to-service statute to include consent to service in an
action in Missouri on a policy issued in Colorado insuring buildings in Colorado);
Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915) (state may provide for service to be
made when nonresident corporation fails to comply with state statute requiring
foreign corporations doing business therein to appoint agents upon whom service
may be made).
The inconsistencies resulting from the fictional consent and presence theories
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Today, the Supreme Court recognizes two types of per-
sonal jurisdiction: "general" and "specific." 31 "Gen-
eral" jurisdiction exists where the defendant is required
to defend against claims made by the plaintiff without re-
gard to the defendant's contacts with the state.3 9 The ex-
ercise of "specific" jurisdiction over a defendant exists
when he is called upon to defend against claims arising
out of or related to his contacts with that state.40 A de-
fendant subject to general jurisdiction, therefore, may be
called upon to defend against all claims that a plaintiff in
that state may hold against him, but under specific juris-
diction the defendant may only be called upon to defend
against claims arising out of the transactions upon which
the assumption of jurisdiction is based.4 '
B. Modern Treatment of Personal Jurisdiction - Rejection of
Traditional Territorial Power Theory.
The Supreme Court turned away from the traditional
territorial power theory in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington.42 In that case the state of Washington sued the In-
ternational Shoe Company for unpaid unemployment
insurance contributions.4 3 The defendant, a Delaware
corporation based in Missouri, had no offices in Washing-
were strongly objected to by commentators. Comment, supra note 20, at 920-23.
Eventually these theories were rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
favor of a new rationale in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. See infra notes
42-56 and accompanying text.
38 Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1872 nn.8,9. The Court cites two commentaries for this
terminology: von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 24, at 1144-64; and Brilmayer,
How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT.
REV. 77, 80-81.
For an example of general jurisdiction see Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (permitting general jurisdiction where defend-
ant's contacts with forum were "continuous and systematic" but unrelated to the
dispute). See also infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
For an example of specific jurisdiction see International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
39 Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1872.
40 Id.
41 Woods, supra note 30, at 863.
41 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
I4 d. at 311.
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ton and entered into no contracts there. International
Shoe employed salesmen who lived in Washington, but
who were supervised and paid from the defendant's office
in St. Louis.44 International Shoe challenged the court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction, arguing that its activi-
ties in Washington were insufficient to manifest its pres-
ence there.4 5
The Supreme Court held that Washington had jurisdic-
tion to enforce the obligations which the defendant had
incurred there. In doing so the Court replaced the pres-
ence and consent theories46 with a new test for compli-
ance with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment: whether the corporation had such minimum
contacts with the state that "maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' ,,47 The Court declared that the proper focus for
determining the sufficiency of the contacts must be not
merely on the quantity of a corporation's activities within
the state, but rather on the "quality and nature" of the
activities and their connection with the activities sued
upon. 48 The Court noted that the defendant's activities in
Washington were continuous activities creating a large
volume of shoe sales in the state, and that the claim
against the defendant arose from that large volume of
business. 49  Accordingly, the Court held that the state of
44 Id. at 313-14.
4- Id. at 315.'
46 See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
47 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)).
48 International Shoe, 326 U. S. at 319. The Court rejected the "presence" theory
stating that term merely symbolized those contacts a corporation has with a state
that are sufficient to satisfy the due process standard. Id. at 316-17.
49 Id. at 320. The Court stated:
[t]he test is not merely . . . whether the activity . . . is a little more
or less. [cites omitted] Whether due process is satisfied must de-
pend rather upon the quality and the nature of the activity. . . .But
to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the
laws of that state. The exercise of that privelege may give rise to
obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are con-
nected with the activities within the state, a procedure which re-
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Washington had jurisdiction over International Shoe.5
In International Shoe the Court analyzed Rosenberg Brothers
& Co. v. Curtis Brown Co. 5 1 to further explain the new juris-
quires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them
can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.
Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 320-21.
51 260 U.S. 516 (1923). In Rosenberg, a small retailer in Oklahoma purchased
goods in New York for resale in Oklahoma. Id. at 517-18. The New York com-
pany filed a suit against the Oklahoma retailer in New York. Id. at 517. The de-
fendant appeared specially and moved to quash the summons arguing that the
corporation was not "present" in New York. Id. The Supreme Court agreed with
the defendant and held that purchases and related trips, without more, are insuffi-
cient to warrant the inference that the corporation is present in a forum state. Id.
The defendant had no contacts in New York except for visits there to make
purchases. Id. at 518. The Court held that these visits, even if they occurred reg-
ularly, would not be sufficient to infer defendant's presence in New York. Id. The
Court indicated that it was immaterial to the case that the cause of action arose
from the defendant's purchases in New York. Id. The Supreme Court in Helicol,
however, declined to "decide the continuing validity of Rosenburg with respect to
an assertion of specific jurisdiction, i.e., where the cause of action arises out of or
relates to the purchases by the defendant in the forum state." Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at
1874 n.12. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
Some courts followed Rosenberg, concluding purchases do not constitute "doing
business." See Blount v. Peerless Chemicals Inc., 316 F.2d 695, 698-99 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 831 (1963) (parent corporation not subject to jurisdiction of
another state based on activities of its subsidiary in that state); Hutchinson v.
Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1930) (infrequent visits to New
York by nonresident corporation's officer did not constitute continuous dealings
required for state to have jurisdiction); Tillay v. Idaho Power Co., 425 F. Supp.
376, 380-82 (E.D. Wash. 1976) (foreign power company's purchase of equipment
was insufficient as minimum contacts where the claim did not arise out of those
purchases); Storie v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 417 F. Supp. 141, 145 (E.D. Mich.
1976) (foreign corporation's purchases through mail and telephone insufficient to
give Michigan courts general personal jurisdiction over corporation); Lichtenberg
v. Bullis School, Inc., 68 A.2d 586, 587 (D.C. 1949) (foreign corporation was not
doing business in District of Columbia so as to become amenable to process there
by maintaining bank account, making purchases, and placing advertisements in
newspapers in that state); Berube v. White Plains Iron Works, Inc., 211 F. Supp.
457, 459 (D. Me. 1962) (renting equipment in the forum for use outside the forum
was not "doing business").
Those courts that did not follow Rosenberg stated that systematic and continuous
purchases in a state allowed that state to exercise its jurisdiction over a defendant
"doing business" in that forum. See Duluth Log Co. v. Pulpwood Co., 137 Minn.
312, 163 N.W. 520, 520-21 (1917) (sending agent to Minnesota to purchase pulp-
wood constituted doing business so as to render the foreign corporation amena-
ble to service of process); Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distr. Co., 299
N.Y. 208, 86 N.E.2d 564, 565-67 (1949) (South African corporation held to be
doing business in New York where its exclusive purchasing agent bought mer-
chandise in New York). The courts did not discuss the relationship between the
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diction doctrine. The Court stated that the "commission
of some single or occasional acts of the corporate agent in
a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liability on the
corporation has not been thought to confer upon the
State [the] authority to enforce it .... *52 A state would,
however, have jurisdiction over a corporation when the
corporation's acts met the new test.53 The Court's focus
thus shifted from an emphasis on territorality to an em-
phasis on minimum contacts and fairness.54
Twelve years after International Shoe, the Supreme Court
in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. ,55 focused on state in-
terest while shedding some light on the new test for per-
purchases and the cause of action, therefore the courts did not consider the rela-
tionship to be important in determining the jurisdictional issue. Id.
In other cases where courts concluded that systematic and continuous buying in
a state constituted "doing business" in the forum, the courts noted the additional
factor that the cause of action arose out of the defendant's purchases. See Premo
Specialty Mfg. Co. v.Jersey-Creme Co., 200 F. 352, 356, 359 (9th Cir. 1912) (ser-
vice of process on foreign corporation's agent visiting California to discuss con-
tract for the purchase of goods held to be valid since such purchases constituted
transaction of business in California); Star Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Red Ash Pocahon-
tas Coal Co., 102 F. Supp. 258, 259 (E.D. Ky. 1951) (foreign coal sales agency
held amenable to service of process in Kentucky where defendant's agents made
purchases of coal there); Dungan, Hood & Co. v. C.F. Bally Ltd., 271 F. 517, 519
(E.D. Pa. 1921) (foreign corporation's agent's acts held to constitute doing of
business by the corporation in Pennsylvania where agent was negotiating contract
to buy leather); Payne &Joubert v. East Union Lumber Co., 109 La. 706, 33 So.
739, 740-41 (1903) (foreign corporation signing a contract for sale in Mississippi
held to be amenable to service of process in Louisiana since defendant consented
to accept delivery of goods in that state). Although the courts mentioned the
relationship between the purchases and the cause of action, the relationship does
not appear to be the basis for the courts' jurisdictional findings. Id.
The Supreme Court of California determined that Rosenberg was obsolete in
light of the minimum contacts test of International Shoe. Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437, 440 (1958). InJahn, the plaintiff
sued to enjoin the defendant from inducing breaches of its distributorship con-
tracts and from using confidential materials the defendant had obtained as the
plaintiff's former exclusive export agent. The court held the defendant was doing
business in the state where it made regular purchases of goods in that state, and
where the cause of action was directly related to defendant's dealings with the
California plaintiffs. Id. at 323 P.2d 441-42.
52 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
53 Id.
Norenburg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction And the Evolutionary Process, 54 No-
ThE DAME LAW. 587, 593 (1978-1979).
- 335 U.S. 220 (1957).
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sonal jurisdiction. In McGee, the nonresident corporation
had assumed the insurance obligations of the deceased's
previous insurer and had sent the deceased, a California
resident, an offer of reinsurance which was accepted.56
The Supreme Court held that this sole contact between
the defendant and the State warranted California's asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction over the insurance com-
pany. The Court stated that, "[i]t is sufficient for
purposes of due process that the suit was based on a con-
tract which had substantial connection with [the forum
state] .... ," 58
Justice Black's opinion for the Court was reminiscent of
his dissent in International Shoe.59 Although Justice Black
refered to the "minimum contacts" test of International
Shoe, 60 he emphasized the state's concern in protecting its
citizens' interests:
It cannot be denied that California has a manifest inter-
est in providing effective means of redress for its citizens
when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These residents
would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to
follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to
hold it legally accountable.6 '
Black also discussed fairness to the corporation, stating
that "modern transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a State where he engages in economic activ-
56 Id. at 221-22. International Life had no other contacts with California be-
yond the offer of reinsurance and the insurance contract. Id. at 222. California
courts asserted personal jurisdiction over International Life, but Texas courts (the
defendant resided in Texas) refused to give the California judgment full faith and
credit, holding that the defendant's contacts with California did not allow such an
assertion ofjurisdiction. Id. at 221.
5 McGee, 355 U.S. at 221-24.
5I ld. at 223.
.9 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 322-26. Justice Black indicated there was no
need to formulate such broad rules for the exercise of personal jurisdiction at that
time. Id. at 322.
- McGee, 355 U.S. at 222.
61 Id. at 223. Justice Black emphasized the state's interest by pointing out that
the state had a strong state regulatory interest in the insurance field. Id.
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ity," 62 but the Justice's main concern was with the state's
interest in the adjudication, rather than with the defend-
ant.63 ThusJustice Black added the element of state inter-
est to the new test of jurisdiction.64
The Court abandoned the traditional theories of pres-
ence and consent in International Shoe and McGee.65 In
both cases the Court expounded the minimum contacts
theory, which requires that a defendant have relationship
with the forum state before that state may assert jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.66 The Court in International Shoe
stated that a corporation will be subject to a state's
juridiction when the corporation's activities in that state
are continuous; 67 the Court added the element of state in-
terest to the minimum contacts theory in McGee.68
C. Defendant's Activities Within Forum State as a
Consideration in the Due Process Analysis
One year after McGee, the Supreme Court decided Han-
son v. Denkla,69 a case in which it invalidated a state's exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
Hanson v. Denkla involved conflicting decisions of a Florida
court and a Delaware court concerning the disposition of
the funds from a trust in Delaware.70 In holding the
62 Id. at 223.
-5 Id. at 223-24. State interest in adjudicating a cause of action is an important
factor in the due process analysis. See Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294
U.S. 623 (1935) (allowing exercise of personal jurisdiction based on the state's
power to regulate the nonresident's activities of selling stocks in that state, and
the state's interest in protecting its own citizens); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927) (allowing exercise of personal jurisdiction based on state's interest in pro-
tecting its citizens from automobile accidents involving nonresidents).
- See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-24. Later the Court limited a state's ability to
assert jurisdiction based on state interest. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying
text.
65 See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
w Id.
67 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
- See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
69 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
70 Id. at 238. The decedent set up a trust while she was domiciled in Penn-
sylvania. Id. The assets of the trust and the trustee were in Delaware. Id. Ten
years later, she moved to Florida, where she exercised her power of appointment,
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trustee's contacts with Florida to be insufficient, the Court
emphasized the fact that the foreign corporation had
never done any other business in Florida, 7' and that the
cause of action did not arise from any business done in
Florida. 2
The Court placed great emphasis on the fact that the
defendants' contacts with the forum were initiated by the
creator of the trust, not the trustee. 73  Writing the opin-
ion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relation-
ship with a nonresident cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State. The application of that rule
will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's ac-
tivity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. 74
The "purposeful availment" requirement added a sub-
jective element to the Court's analysis of minimum con-
tacts.75 The Court's focus moved from state interest in
the litigation to the defendant's actions. 76 The Court con-
assigning the remainder of the trust to her grandchildren in trust. Id. at 239.
When she died her daughters sought a declaratory judgment in Florida regarding
the assets of the trust. Id. at 242. The Florida courts decided to assert jurisdiction
over both the assets of the trust and the trustee, a foreign corporation. Id. The
trustee's only contacts with Florida were its dealings with the decedent. Id. at 251,
253. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Florida Supreme
Court, holding that Florida did not have jurisdiction. Id. at 256.
7, Id. at 251. The Court noted that the defendant had no office in Florida, had
never solicited business there, and had never transacted business there or held or
administered trust assets in Florida. Id.
72 Id. at 251-52. The Court stated, "[t]he cause of action in this case is not one
that arises out of an act done or transaction consummated in the forum state ...
[T]his action involves the validity of an agreement that was entered into without
any connection with the forum State." Id.
7- Id. The Court also distinguished Hanson from McGee by noting that the state
of Florida showed no strong interest in this kind of situation by failing to enact a
special long-arm statute. Id. at 252. See generally supra notes 59-63 and accompa-
nying text.
74Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319) [emphasis
added].
75 Woods, supra note 30, at 885.
76 The Hanson majority stressed that a nonresident defendant would remain
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tinued to insist on contacts between the state and the non-
resident defendant, noting that although McGee
recognized the trend of expanding personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents, restrictions still existed as a conse-
quence of territorial limitations on the power of the re-
spective states." The Court expressly rejected the
argument that when a state is the "center of gravity" of a
controversy, it should have jurisdictional authority over
the controversy.78
All of the cases discussed up to this point deal with
claims related to the defendants' activities within the fo-
rum state. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. ,79 how-
ever, involved a suit in Ohio against a nonresident mining
company on a cause of action not arising from the com-
pany's activities in the state.8 0 The Court held that where
the cause of action does not arise from business done
within the forum state,"' due process requires that the ac-
tivities in the state be conducted "systematically and con-
tinuously" so as to make it "fair and reasonable to subject
that corporation to proceedings in personam in that
state."'8 2 Thus the Court focused on fairness to the non-
outside of a state's jurisdictional reach unless he had minimum contacts with the
state because those contacts were a "prerequisite to its exercise of power over
him." Id. at 251.
7Hanson, 326 U.S. at 251. The requirement that the defendant's activities in
the state be conducted purposefully was ignored by some courts, and it caused
consternation in others. Woods, supra note 30, at 855 (citing Phillips v. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966) (refusing to apply the
Hanson language literally)); Hazard, supra note 25, at 243-44.
78 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254. Some commentators suggest the Court in Hanson
substituted "minimum contacts" for presence and consent to jurisdiction, without
explaining the underlying motives of the decision. Lilly, supra note 20, at 93.
79 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
80 The company's mining operations in the Philippines were suspended during
World War II. During that time, the president of the company went to Ohio
where he maintained an office, did business for the company, and kept records.
The plaintiff's cause of action did not involve the company's activities in Ohio.
She was, instead, suing for dividends based on the company's profits from its Phil-
ippine operations. Id. at 439, 447-48.
81 The mining in the Phillippines had recommenced when suit was brought in
Ohio in 1947, a fact which the Supreme Court did not point out. Lilly, supra note
20, at 1144.
2 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445.
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resident defendant to determine if its activities within the
state are so substantial and of such a nature as to allow a
state to adjudicate a cause of action against the nonresi-
dent defendant. 83  The Court added fairness to the de-
fendant as another element of the minimum contacts
theory ofjurisdiction, which at this point consisted of the
quality and nature of the defendant's activities in the fo-
rum state, and the forum state's interest in those
activities.84
From 1958 until 1977 the Supreme Court was silent on
the issue of personal jurisdiction. Then in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner,8 5 the Supreme Court recharacterized International
Shoe's minimum contacts standard and applied it to cer-
tain assertions of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 6 In Shaffer, a
nonresident brought a shareholder's derivative suit in
Delaware against Greyhound, a Delaware corporation,
and against twenty-eight of the corporation's nonresident
directors and officers.8 7 The plaintiff took advantage of a
Delaware statute allowing stock in a Delaware corporation
to be attached to provide quasi in rem 8 jurisdiction over its
owner. 9 The Court held that an assertion of jurisdiction
over property was an assertion of jurisdiction over the
8s Id. at 447. The Court in Helicol cites Perkins as an example of general jurisdic-
tion. 104 S. Ct. at 1872. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
5 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
88 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 195. For an explanation of quasi in rem, in rem, and in
personam jurisdiction, see supra note 20.
87 Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189-90. The plaintiff alleged that in Oregon the directors
and officers had caused the corporation to be liable for large antitrust damages
and fines in violation of their duties to Greyhound. Id.
88 See supra note 20.
89 Id. The statute provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and ju-
risdiction of all courts held in this State, but not for the purpose of
taxation, the state of the ownership of the capital stock of all corpo-
rations existing under the laws of this State, whether organized
under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as in this State.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1983). The plaintiff in this case was able to seques-
ter stock valued at approximately $1.2 million. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 192 n.7. The
plaintiff alleged the defendants breached their duties to Greyhound, resulting in
the imposition of the corporations being held liable in an antitrust suit and a crim-
inal contempt action. Id. at 190.
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property's owner, and that "all assertions of state court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards
set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." 90
The Court added new elements to the minimum con-
tacts doctrine by stating that "the central concern of the
inquiry into personal jurisdiction" 9' is the relationship
"among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather
than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on
which the rules of Pennoyer rest."' 92 Reformulating the
doctrine the Court in this way raised the question of
whether in certain cases state interest could be so strong
as to create the proper personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant.93
Applying the recharacterized International Shoe stan-
dards of minimum contacts to the facts in Shaffer, the
Court noted that the cause of action arose outside of the
state and that the record failed to show that the defendant
officials had ever been in Delaware. 94 The Court stated
that the defendants "simply had nothing to do with the
state of Deleware" and thus Delaware had no jurisdiction
over the property's owner, and that the claims were un-
connected to the property sequestered.9 5 The Court con-
cluded that Delaware lacked the power to assert
jurisdiction over the nonresident Greyhound officials. 96
9o Id. at 212.
Id. at 204.
92 Id. (emphasis added).
93 Dorsaneo, Due Process, Full Faith and Credit and Family Law Litigation, 36 Sw. L.
J. 1085, 1097, 1001 (1983). Professor Dorsaneo notes that the Court in Shaffer
failed to set forth the weight to be given to the relationship between the forum
and the litigation. Id. at 1097. However, later Supreme Court opinions indicate
that the defendant must have some relationship with the forum. Id. at 1097 n.69.
See also World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); see also infra note 122 and accompanying text.
- Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216.
95 Id.
- Id. at 216-17. The Court did leave the door open for the presence of prop-
erty within the state to grant jurisdiction in rem in certain situations. Id. at 208. A
noted commentator states that such suits are still permissible because of "(1) the
nonresident's claimed interest in the property at issue; (2) the conferral of bene-
fits and protection by the forum state; and (3) the state's interest in the marketa-
bility of property located within its boundaries. These factors combine to satisfy
1985] CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
In actuality, the Court again looked to the defendant in its
analysis of jurisdiction, and re-emphasized the subjective
element that it had first recognized in Hanson.97
The Supreme Court again used a defendant-biased
analysis of personal jurisdiction in Kulko v. Superior Court of
California.8 In that case the Court held that, by merely
allowing his daughter to move to California to live with
her mother, a father residing in New York did not have
minimum contacts with California. 99 The children lived
with each parent during different times of the year.100
When both children decided to stay in California, the
mother brought a suit to gain custody and increase child
support.' 0 t The Supreme Court conceded that California
had a strong interest in the children's financial welfare,
but found that the defendant had not purposefully availed
himself of California's benefits and privileges, and thus
could not reasonably have foreseen being called to Cali-
fornia to defend against a claim there.10 2
The Court gave two reasons that California's state in-
terest was insufficient to allow its exercise of jurisdic-
tion. 103 First, California failed to enact a special
jurisdictional statute asserting an interest in this kind of
litigation. 04 Second, the Court concluded that the wife
could obtain a New York adjudiction on the support issue
without having to leave California, through the Uniform
the 'contacts' and 'fairness' elements of International Shoe." Lilly, supra note 20,
at 98 n.57. Because some kinds of in rem proceedings survive Shaffer, Lilly states,
"the obvious impact of Shaffer is to limit jurisdiction where the property of a non-
resident is seized in order to provide a basis for prosecuting an unrelated claim."
Id. at 98.
97 See Woods, supra note 30, at 885-88. Justice Stevens concluded the defend-
ant's contacts must be such that a reasonable defendant would foresee the possi-
bility of defending a suit in that state, thus having "fair notice." Shaffer, 433 U.S.
at 218 (Stevens, J. concurring).
9,, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)
- Id. at 87-88.
loo Id.
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Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act in force in both
states. 105
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 10 6 the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed the "purposeful availment" ele-
ment of Hanson required for the minimum contacts stan-
dard. The plaintiffs, residents of New York, purchased an
Audi automobile in New York from Seaway Volk-
swagen.'0 7 A year later the plaintiffs decided to move.
10 8
While driving through Oklahoma on the way to their new
home in Arizona, the plaintiffs were involved in an auto-
mobile accident.' 0 9 They brought a products liability suit
in Oklahoma state court against the dealer and a regional
automobile distributor that served only northeastern
states. 110 These defendants objected to Oklahoma's as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction because there was no evi-
dence that either defendant conducted business activity
in Oklahoma."' The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld
jurisdiction over the distributor based on the foreseeabil-
ity that a car will be driven in other states." t2 That court
also noted the cost of the automobile, concluding that the
defendants enjoyed profits derived from sales in New
York of automobiles that from time to time were used in
Oklahoma.' '3
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that even if it were foreseeable that the plaintiffs would
drive their car into Oklahoma, foreseeability alone was in-
sufficient to support jurisdiction in that state.' 14 The
Court emphasized that a state has personal jurisdiction
105 Id.
- 444 U.S. 286 (1980).




i Id. at 289.
112 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla.
1978).
" Id. at 354. Based on this conclusion the Oklahoma court was able to hold
that the state's long-arm statute, which reached defendants deriving substantial
revenue from goods used in that state, authorized jurisdiction in that case. Id.
114 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296.
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over a nonresident only if certain minimum contacts exist
between the defendant and the state."l 5 The Court also
identified three separate interests that could be consid-
ered in an appropriate case:'" 6 first, the plaintiff's interest
in obtaining effective relief where that interest is not ade-
quately protected by the plaintiff's ability to choose the
forum; 1 7 second, the interstate judicial system's interest
115 Id. at 293-94. The Court made clear that minimum contacts has two dimen-
sions: (1) limitations prescribed by the Constitution which distributes judicial
power among the states ensuring co-equal sovereignty, id., and (2) limitations pre-
scribed by the Constitution which protect the defendant, through fairness, from
being called to defend against claims in inconvenient forums. Id. at 297. See also,
Lilly, supra note 20, at 104.
The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen stated that although it noted in McGee the
changes taking place in the development of the personal jurisdiction doctrine, the
Court "never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdic-
tional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution." Id. at 293. The Court then explained
that the Framers wrote the Constitution with a desire to give the states economic
interdependence as well as "many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in
particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts." Id. The Court con-
cluded that every state's own sovereignty thus limits the sovereignty of all of the
other states - with that limitation being in both the original Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court recognized it abandoned the traditional
"presence" theory of Pennoyer in International Shoe. Id. In World-Wide Volkswagen
the Court stressed that assessing the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction
over a defendant must be done in light of "our federal system of government."
Id. at 293-94 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317).
The Court went on to explain that the Due Process Clause acts as an instrument
of interstate federalism by requiring a defendant to have contacts, ties, or rela-
tions with a state before that state may assert jurisdiction over him. World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 and Hanson,
357 U.S. at 254). The Court stated this element of due process may sometimes
act to divest a state of its adjudicatory power even if it would not inconvenience
the defendant to defend itself against a claim in that state, even if the state has a
strong state interest, and even if the most convenient location for the litigation is
the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at
251, 254). The Court continued to focus on the defendant in analyzing personal
jurisdiction: "[It] is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into
the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with
the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
The Court looked at the fairness element of minimum contacts and recognized
the need to consider several relevant factors "including the interests of the plain-
tiff in a convenient forum and of the state in adjudicating the dispute." Lilly, supra
note 20, at 104.
-6 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
,17 Id. (citing Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37).
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in resolving conflicts efficiently;" t8 and third, the forum
state's interest in adjudicating the dispute." 9
Even with these considerations the Court required
some contacts to result from the defendant's activities. In
this case, the plaintiff's unilateral activity was the only
reason that the defendant's products caused injury in
Oklahoma. 20 The Court added that only where a defend-
ant made efforts to serve directly. or indirectly the market
for its products in the state would the state be reasonable
and fair in choosing to exercise jurisdiction over such a
defendant.' 2 ' The defendant, according to the Court, will
not be found to have purposefully availed itself of a state's
benefits unless the defendant has clear notice that it is
subject to suit in that state. 22  This notice is clear where a
corporation delivers its products "into the stream of com-
merce 2 3 with the expectation that [the product will] be
purchased by consumers in the forum state." 124
-s World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291 (citing Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93, 98).
- World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
12o Id. at 298.
121 Id. at 297. Requiring the defendant to conduct such purposeful activities
prevents constrictions on commerce which might result ifjurisdiction were based
solely on foreseeability that a single tortious act outside the forum would result in
an injury within the forum. See Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502
(4th Cir. 1956).
22 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
121 One commentator states this "stream of commerce" language allows courts
to assert jurisdiction over businesses that market their products widely among the
states. Lilly, supra note 20, at 105 n.76. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). In that case jurisdiction
was asserted over an Ohio corporation which manufactured valves that were in-
corporated into boilers by another company. The boiler company sold one of its
products to the plaintiff in Illinois. The plaintiff was injured when the boiler ex-
ploded. The plaintiff then brought suit in Illinois against the Ohio manufacturer.
The Illinois courts interpreted the state's long-arm statute to include tortious con-
duct outside the state producing in-state injury. Id. at 762-63.
124 d. World-Wide Volkswagen is criticized as being unconvincing in its denial of
Oklahoma's power over the defendant, since Oklahoma was the most "reason-
able" state for this litigation. Lilly, supra note 20, at 106. The Court's emphasis
on the defendant's contacts with the forum through the defendant's "purposeful
availment" may overshadow the interests of both the state and the litigation. Id.
at 107.
For further discussion of World-Wide Volkswagen, see Note, Civil Procedure - Per-
sonalJurisdiction, 46J. AIR L. & CoM. 541 (1981).
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The court recently gave great consideration to the
state's interest over that of the defendant in two libel
cases. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 125 the Court held
the alleged act of libel occurred within the forum state.' 26
The defendant circulated thousands of copies of Hustler
magazine in New Hampshire every month.12 7 The Court
stated this activity was "sufficient to support jurisdiction
when the cause of action arises out of the very activity be-
ing conducted, in part, in New Hampshire."'' 28
The Court stated that the proper test to use in judging
minimum contacts is the Shaffer v. Heitner test, which fo-
cuses on "the relationship among the defendant, the fo-
rum, and the litigation."'' 29  The Court found New
Hampshire's interest was to discourage the deception of
its citizens and to redress injuries actually taking place
within the state. 3 0 The Court also noted that New Hamp-
shire expressed its interest in protecting non-resident
plaintiffs from libel through the state's long-arm
statute. 13
Even with the Court's focus on New Hampshire's inter-
est in the litigation, the Court still required that the con-
tacts between the defendant and the forum must be such
that it is "fair" to compel the defendant to defend in that
forum. 13 2 The Court demonstrated that state interest
alone is not sufficient to grant jurisdiction over a non-resi-
dent defendant. In this case the defendant had purpose-
fully availed itself of New Hampshire's benefits, and the
Court stated the defendant "must reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there in a libel action based on the
125 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
126 Id. at 1479, 1481.
127 Id. at 1477.
128 Id. at 1481. The Court noted the degree of activity was not sufficient to
support general jurisdiction but it was sufficient for specific jurisdiction. Id.
129 Id. at 1478 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204).
so Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1479. The tort of libel occurs wherever the libelous




342 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [50
contents of the magazine." 133
In Calder v. Jones,134 a companion case to Keeton, the
Court allowed California to assert jurisdiction over a non-
resident where the cause of action did not arise directly
out of the defendant's activities in California, but where
the libel was clearly foreseeable as to its effect in Califor-
nia. The plaintiff, a professional entertainer, sued in Cali-
fornia, although the allegedly libelous article was written
and edited by the defendants in Florida.135 Neither de-
fendant had relevant contacts with California. 36 How-
ever, the Court found that the article would have a
"potentially devastating impact" on the plaintiff in Cali-
fornia, where the magazine has its largest circulation,
leading to the conclusion that the defendants must have
reasonably anticipated being "haled into court there" to
defend the truth of the article. 3 7
Even though the Court focused primarily on Califor-
nia's relation to the suit, Calder cannot be read to mean
that substantial state interest alone can create personal ju-
risdiction over a defendant. The Court noted that if the
defendants' article injured the plaintiff, intentional
wrongdoing directed at a California resident created suffi-
cient contacts, and jurisdiction was proper over them on
that basis.13 8 The Court used the International Shoe test to
again assert that there must be minimum contacts be-
tween the defendant and the forum state before a state
court may exercise jurisdiction. 39
At the time Helicol came to trial the Supreme Court had
developed a due process test that required the existence
of certain minimum contacts between the defendant and
I Id. at 1481.
104 S. Ct. 1482 (1983).
-5 Id. at 1485. The defendants wrote and edited the article for the National
Enquirer. Id. The article portrayed the plaintiff, actress Shirley Jones, as a prob-
lem drinker. Id. at 1487 n.9.
1 Id. at 1485.
157 Id. at 1487.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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the forum state before a state could exercise jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant.140 In determining whether
a state had jurisdiction over a defendant's activities within
the forum state, 14 the Court emphasized relevant factors
such as the state's interest in those activities,142 the state's
use of a special statute concerning those activities, 143 fair-
ness to the defendant in requiring him to defend himself
in the forum state, 144 and the plaintiff's interest in ob-
taining effective relief.'45 The Court favored the defend-
ant in its application of the minimum contacts test by
requiring, for jurisdictional purposes, that the defendant
purposefully avail himself of the forum state's benefits, 14 6
and by requiring that the defendant have sufficient con-
tacts with the state, even if the State has a great interest in
the litigation. 4 7
II. HELICOPTEROS NACIONALES DE COLUMBIA V. HALL
The Supreme Court in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia
v. Hall had to determine if the Texas Supreme Court was
correct in asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident de-
fendant whose only contacts with the state were frequent
purchases of helicopters and related training sessions in
Texas, one visit to the state to negotiate a contract, and
acceptance of checks drawn on a Texas bank. 4 ' Texas
courts invoked jurisdiction even though the cause of ac-
40 See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
14 Id.
-+ See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
14 Id.
- See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
1-5 See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
146 See supra note 102 and notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 126-139 and accompanying text.
-4 Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1871-72. Helicol had no other contacts with Texas.
Helicol had no agent for service of process within the state and it was not author-
ized to do business in Texas. Id. at 1871. It never solicited business in the state,
never performed helicopter operations in Texas, and never sold any product that
reached Texas. Id. Helicol never had an office in Texas, had no records there,
had no shareholders there, had no employees based there, and had never re-
cruited employees in Texas. Id.
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tion did not arise out of these contacts.' 49 The Texas
Supreme Court, relying on the "reasonableness" test in
World-Wide Volkswagen, determined that it would not be in-
convenient for Helicol to defend in Texas. 50  The
United States Supreme Court, however, held that the de-
fendant's contacts did not constitute such continuous and
systematic general business contacts' 5 ' as to allow Texas
to exercise jurisdiction over Helicol where the cause of
action did not arise out of nor was related to those
contacts.
52
The Court stated that the Due Process Clause operates
to limit a state's power over nonresident corporate de-
fendants, and that due process requirements are satisfied
only where a defendant has minimum contacts with a state
such that the state's assertion of jurisdiction does not of-
fend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."' 153 The Court pointed out that, based on Shaffer v.
Heitner,'5 4 there must be some relationship between the
defendant, the forum state, and the litigation when a
cause of action is related to or rises out of a defendant's
contacts. 155 But if the cause of action does not arise out of
or relate to the defendant's activities in the state, Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 156 stands for the proposi-
tion that "due process is not offended by a State's subject-
ing the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when
there are sufficient contacts between the State and the for-
eign corporation."' 57
The Court determined that all of the parties agreed that
149 Hall, 638 S.W.2d at 872.
150 Id.
15 For a discussion of general jurisdiction see notes 38-41 and accompanying
text.
52 Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1873.
is Id. at 1872 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945)).
- 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
,1' Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1873. This kind of assertion of power is called specific
jurisdiction. See supra note 38.
I- See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
15 Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1873.
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Respondent's claim against Helicol did not arise out of
and were not related to Helicol's contacts with Texas.15 8
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan noted that
there could be a distinction between claims that relate to a
defendant's contacts with the forum and claims that arise
out of such contacts.' 5 9 The Court declined to address
that distinction as the issue was not presented in the
case.' 60 In so declining, the Court left open the possibility
that the required contacts between the defendant and the
forum need only be related in some way for a state to have
specific jurisdiction over the defendant.' 6 1 Although Jus-
tice Brennan admitted that the respondents' claim "did
not formally 'arise out of' specific activities initiated by
Helicol . . . the wrongful death claim .. .[was] signifi-
cantly related to the undisputed contacts between Helicol
and the forum."' 162 Because the Court found no jurisdic-
tion based on specific grounds, it looked to the nature of
Helicol's activities in Texas to determine whether Texas
courts could assert general jurisdiction over Helicol. 63
The Court held that Helicol's activities were not "the kind
of continuous and systematic general business contacts"
which were found in Perkins. ' 4
In determining whether Helicol had established general
business contacts in Texas, the Court first examined the
,so Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1872-73.
139 Id. at 1875. For example, the Court could have stated that the plaintiffs'
claims of negligence were related to the training which Helicol's pilots received
through its contacts with Bell Helicopter in Texas, and that the defendant's con-
tacts with Texas were sufficient for jurisdictional purposes.
-6 Id. at 1873 n.10. The Court stated that the plaintiffs failed to argue that
their claims against Helicol either arose out of or were related to Helicol's con-
tacts with Texas. Id. Justice Brennan disagreed that the respondents had admit-
ted that their claims were not related to Helicol's activities in Texas. Id. at 1877-
78 n.3. He admitted that the respondents' position before the Court lacked clarity
but stated that the Court should have addressed the specific jurisdiction question
due to the relation between Helicol's contacts and the cause of action involved.
Id.
'l'c The Court stated that Texas did not have specific jurisdiction over Helicol.
Id. at 1873.
162 Id. at 1878.
163 Id. at 1873.
164 Id.
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nature of Helicol's payments received from Texas banks.
The Court, relying on Kulko v. California Superior Court165
and Hanson v. Denkla,' 6 6 concluded that such unilateral ac-
tivity of the plaintiff is insufficient as a contact for jurisdic-
tional purposes.16 7 The Court then analyzed Helicol's
purchases as contacts with Texas. 68  Citing Rosenberg,'
69
the Court stated purchases alone are not sufficient as a
basis for a state's exercise of jurisdiction. 7 0 The Court
further stated that mere purchases, even if continuous
and systematic, are not sufficient contacts to permit a state
to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corpora-
tion in a cause of action not related to the purchase trans-
actions.17 ' The Court also refused to hold that the brief
presence of Helicol's employees in Texas for training in
connection with the purchase of helicopters and equip-
ment resulted in a jurisdictional contact with the state. 72
The Court stated that training was included in the pack-
age of goods and services purchased by Helicol. 173 Hold-
ing that Helicol lacked sufficient contacts with the forum
state to allow Texas to assert personal jurisdiction the
Supreme Court reversed. 7
4
Justice Brennan advocated giving states more leeway in
165 See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
- See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
167 Helicol, 104 S.Ct. at 1873. The Court additionally relied on Lilly, supra note
20, at 99.
Helicol, 104 S.Ct. at 1873.
' See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Noting that the Rosenberg holding
survived the transition from traditional concepts of jurisdiction to the modern
minimum contacts test, the Court stated that Rosenberg was acknowledged and not
repudiated in International Shoe. Id. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
170 Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1874. In his dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the
Court's use of Rosenberg. Id. at 1875. He stated that the Court failed to "ascertain
whether the narrow view of in personam jurisdiction adopted by the Court in Rosen-
berg compares with 'the fundamental transformation of our national economy' that




174 Id. The Court noted that it is arguable that Rosenberg would not allow
purchases to be sufficient contacts for either general or specific jurisdiction. Id. at
1874 n.12. Thus the Court implied that Rosenbeig is no longer valid as to asser-
tions of specific jurisdiction.
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asserting jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who
have substantial commercial contacts with the forum.' 75
He stated that the recent growth of the national economy
has created the need to expand the scope of person juris-
diction. 176 He further argued that expanding the permis-
sible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations
comports with International Shoe standards of the "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'' 77 Ap-
plying these standards to the instant case, Justice Brennan
argued that Texas properly asserted jurisdiction over
Helicol.' 7 8 Noting that the petitioner received many ben-
efits from its business dealings in the state, he concluded
that Helicol should be required to "face the obligations
that attach to its participation in such commercial
transactions."1 79
III. IMPLICATIONS
Because the facts and circumstances surrounding Helicol
are unusual and distinct, the Court's holding should be
narrowly construed. The most apparent difference be-
tween Helicol and other personal jurisdiction cases is that
Helicol is a foreign-country corporation. Choosing Helicol
to broaden the scope of the minimum contacts test might
have placed a burden on international commerce by dem-
onstrating that buying products in the United States could
leave a foreign country corporation open to an unrelated
suit in the United States. Perhaps the Court viewed the
facts of Helicol as unique and therefore chose to defer
making substantial changes in the personal jurisdiction
175 id. at 1876.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1877. Justice Brennan pointed to language in McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-
23 and World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293, to show that this trend is not a new
idea. Id. at 1876. Both opinions discuss historical developments in modern trans-
portation and communication which enable a defendant to defend himself more
easily in a state where he does business. Id.
978 Id. at 1877.
179 Id.
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test until a future case.' 8 °
The Court may also have found little in the case to al-
low it to further develop the state interest element of the
minimum contacts test as reformulated in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner.'8 ' Texas evidently had no substantial interest in the
litigation, since none of the respondents were residents of
Texas 8 2 and the accident occurred in Peru. 8 3 The Court
pointed out that the respondents failed to carry their bur-
den of demonstrating, under the doctrine of necessity,
that all three defendants could not be sued in a single fo-
rum.' 8 4 Therefore, the instant case lacked the facts to al-
low the Court to develop the state interest branch of the
minimum contacts test. 8 5
Only one principle can be safely extracted from Helicol.
The Court clearly held that purchases in a state do not
establish minimum contacts unless the underlying cause
of action relates to or arises out of those contacts. The
Court left for a later date any discussion of possible differ-
ences between a cause of action relating to and a cause of
action arising out of the defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum state.'
86
- The case could probably have been handled more efficiently under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(c), & 1332(d)
(1982).
18, See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
,82 See supra note 16.
183 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
184 Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1874 n.13. For discussion of the necessity theory of
jurisdiction see Brilmayer, supra note 38, at 108-10 and von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 38 at 1173-74.
185 As discussed earlier, the Court recognized that state interest is an important
factor in determining jurisdiction. See supra notes 126-139 and accompanying text
discussing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. and Calder v. Jones. Although an
argument could be made that state interest could be a surrogate for a defendant's
connection to the forum, it seems unlikely that the Court is willing to grant juris-
diction over a defendant unless he has some contacts with the state.
The Court also refused to consider the plaintitFs interest element of the mini-
mum contacts test, ostensibly because of the availability of Peruvian courts to the
claimants. Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1874 n. 13. See also supra notes 117-120.
1- Helicol, 104 S. Ct. at 1874.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Helicol gave further definition to
the minimum contacts boundary of state personal juris-
diction. By holding that the defendant's commercial deal-
ings with Texas were insufficient to allow the state to
assert jurisdiction, the Court has placed mere purchases
outside of the jurisdictional purview of state courts.
Therfore, unless the claim arises out of or is related to
purchases, foreign buyers of a state's goods or services
cannot be compelled to defend in that state.
There is very little language in the majority opinion
clarifying when a cause of action relates to or arises out of
the defenant's contacts with the forum state. It is difficult
to predict other fact situations where the holding in Helicol
will apply. It is possible that the narrowness of the hold-
ing will allow the Supreme Court to limit its application in
future cases where the facts fall in the gray area between
International Shoe and Helicol.
The Supreme Court has drawn the constitutional line in
requiring a nexus between defendant's purchases and
plaintiff's cause of action before a state may assert juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant. Without such
nexus, a state may claim jurisdiction only if the nonresi-
dent defendant is carrying on its general business in that
forum. Although the Court has not recently used the
"presence" language of earlier procedure cases, there re-
mains that principle from the past that, for jurisdictional
purposes, the defendant must in some way be present
within the boundaries of the forum state. It remains to be
seen whether the Supreme Court will apply the "arise out
of" and "relate to" terminology, either to retain strong





TORTS - DAMAGES FOR MENTAL ANGUISH OVER THE INJU-
RIES OF A THIRD PERSON - Louisiana Law Prohibits a By-
stander from Recovering Damages for Mental Anguish
Suffered Because of Another's Injury or Death. LeConte v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 736 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.
1984).
On July 9, 1982, Pan Am flight 759 crashed in Kenner,
Louisiana, shortly after takeoff from New Orleans Interna-
tional Airport.' The plane came down in a Kenner resi-
dential neighborhood. 2 Thirteen homes were damaged or
destroyed when the Boeing 727-200 crashed or by the
subsequent explosions and fires.3 All 145 passengers plus
11 Kenner residents were killed in the accident.4
Fire and rescue equipment from the surrounding area
was rushed to the scene of the crash.5 Law enforcement,
fire, and rescue personnel were ordered to report to the
crash site6 and Civil Defense officials issued an urgent ap-
peal for volunteers to help search for bodies and clear
debris.7 Off-duty police officers Alfred 0. LeConte, Jr.
and Peter A. Engman responded to the request.8 During
the next twenty-seven hours, LeConte searched for survi-
vors and placed victims into body bags.9 Engman spent
several hours at the crash site and photographed victims
I LeConte v. Pan American World Airways, 736 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984); N.Y.
Times, July 10, 1982, at 1, col. 6. See also NEWSWEEK, July 19, 1982, at 28; TIME,
July 19, 1982, at 42.
2 N.Y. Times, July 10, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
5 Id. at 29, col. 1; Id.,July 11, 1982, at 21, col 1.
4 LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1019; N.Y. Times, July 10, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
5 N.Y. Times, July 10, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
6 LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1020.
7 N.Y. Times, July 10, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
8 LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1020.
9 Id. The remains of the 156 victims filled over 170 body bags. Only one survi-
vor, a baby from one of the houses destroyed by the crash, was found in the
wreckage. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1982, at 21, col. 1.
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of the crash.'0 Both men contend that they suffer severe
nausea, vomiting, insomnia, nightmares, nervousness and
anxiety as a result of their activities at the crash site.1'
LeConte and Engman sued Pan Am and United States
Aviation Underwriters for mental anguish arising from
handling or photographing the bodies of the crash vic-
tims. 12  Pan Am did not deny liability for the accident, l3
but filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and, in
the alternative, for summary judgment for failure to state
a cause of action.' 4 The District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, applying Louisiana law, granted the
motion for summary judgment.' 5 The plaintiffs appealed
the district court's judgment to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.' 6 Held, affirmed: Louisiana law prohibits recovery
by a bystander for mental anguish suffered as a result of
another's injury or death. LeConte v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 736 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984).
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND - MENTAL ANGUISH
DAMAGE RECOVERY
A. Louisiana Negligence Law
Louisiana's legal system differs from the legal systems
in the rest of the United States. 17 Louisiana was governed
10 Le Conte, 736 F.2d at 1020.
i Id.
12 Id.
s Id. Pan Am also did not contest liability in the only other reported case aris-
ing from this air crash. Marks v. Pan American World Airways, 591 F. Supp. 827
(E.D. La. 1984).
t4 LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1020.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1019.
1" See generally, McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV. 1
(1960). Rather than adopting the English Common law, Louisiana chose to retain
its system of jurisprudence which was patterned after the Code Napoleon and
influenced by the Spanish system and by the English-style systems of the sur-
rounding states. Id. Louisiana's Constitution of 1812 provided that "The existing
laws in this territory, when this constitution goes into effect, shall continue to be
in force until altered or abolished by the Legislature". LA. CONST. of 1812, art.
IV, § 11. The Constitution further provided that "the Legislature shall never
adopt any system or code of laws, by a general reference to the said system or
code, but in all cases, shall specify the several provisions of the laws it may enact."
[50
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by the French Civil Code when the territory was
purchased by the United States in 1803.8 After the Loui-
siana Purchase, Louisiana citizens chose to retain their ex-
isting legal system, which was based substantially upon
the Code Napoleon.' 9 This choice was codified in the
Louisiana Constitution of 1812 which was adopted just
prior to Louisiana's statehood. 20 Louisiana is, in essence,
a civil code jurisdiction. 2' Thus, the rights of Louisiana
citizens are more heavily dependent upon the express lan-
guage of the state's statutes and constitution than are the
rights of citizens of other states. 2
The right to recover damages for injuries caused by the
acts of others is defined through interpretation of three
articles in the Louisiana Civil Code. 23  First, article 2315
requires every citizen to pay for the damage which he
Id. In addition, "[t]heJudges of all courts within [Louisiana], shall, as often as it
may be possible to do, in every definitive judgment, refer to the particular law, in
virtue of which such judgment may have been rendered, and in all cases adduce
the reasons on which their judgment is founded." Id. at art. IV, § 12. Similar
intent to inhibit the creation ofjudge-made law can be found in succeeding Loui-
siana constitutions. See, e.g., LA. CoNsT. of 1974; LA. CONST. of 1921, art. VII, § 1;
LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 91. Thus, the Louisiana courts have been left to interpret
the statutes and codes passed by the Louisiana Legislature.
Louisiana judges were not forbidden from following precedent as they were in
the Code Napoleon. Comment, Stare Decisis in Louisiana, 7 TUL. L. REV. 100
(1933). The courts will not, however, disturb long standing interpretations of law
without legislative guidance. Thompson v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd,
303 So. 2d 855 (La. Ct. App. 1974). "Law is a solemn expression of legislative
will," LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1 (West 1952), and the courts are expected to
consider the "reason and spirit" of the law. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 18 (West
1952). See generally LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 13-21 (West 1952). The effective re-
sult of this approach has been the development of two parallel bodies of law (one
of statutes and one ofjudicial interpretation), neither having precedential value to
the other. See also Batiza, Origins of Modern Codification of the Civil Law: The French
Experience and its Implications for Louisiana Law, 56 TuL. L. REv. 479 (1982); Deak,
The Place of the "Case" in the Common and the Civil Law, 8 TUL. L. REV. 337 (1934).
18 McMahon, supra note 17.
19 Id.
2o LA. CONST. of 1812, art IV, § 11 (adopted 3 months before Louisiana was
admitted as a state by Act of April 8, 1812, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 701).
21 See generally J. Dainow, CivIL CODE OF LouiSIANA (1947); see also McMahon,
supra note 17.
22 See supra note 20.
23 Id.
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causes.24 Second, article 2316 extends liability to damage
caused by a person's negligence, imprudence or want of
skill.25 Third, article 1934 provides for damages in cases
of contract, quasi-contract, offenses, or quasi-offenses.26
Article 1934 specifically recognizes that damages may be
assessed without calculating specific pecuniary losses of
the party27 and that the judge and jury must have substan-
tial discretion when quantifying damages. 28  Despite the
broad language of these statutes, Louisiana courts have
not compensated plaintiffs who suffer mental anguish
over the negligently caused injuries of a third party.29
These so-called "bystander ' 30 injuries arise in a variety of
contexts.3 1
B. Recovery of Mental Anguish Damages in Louisiana
The Louisiana Supreme Court first addressed the issue
of a bystander's recovery for mental anguish over a third
24 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1984). Article 2315 has remained
substantially unchanged since 1800. Id.
25 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2316 (West 1979). Article 2316 has remained sub-
stantially the same since 1825 when "want of skill" was added. Other than the
1825 addition, there has been no substantive change since 1800. Id.
26 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art 1934(3) (West 1977)(renumbered effective January 1,
1985 to LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art 1998 (West Supp. 1985).
27 Id.
28 Id. See also LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art 1999 (West Supp. 1985).
29 For example, Louisiana courts frequently denied "loss of consortium, ser-
vice, and society" damages to a plaintiff whose spouse has been injured. See, e.g.,
Lanham v. Woodward, Wight & Co., 386 So. 2d 131 (La. Ct. App. 1980). A 1982
amendment to the Louisiana statutes finally created the right to these damages.
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1984).
-0 "Bystander," as used in this Note, refers to an individual whose injury, either
in whole or in part, arises from observation of, or empathetic reaction to, another
person's physical injury, indignity or death or the injury to or destruction of the
individual's property.
11 Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441. P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (child
was run over by car as mother and sister watched); Pearce v. LJ. Earnest, Inc., 411
So. 2d 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (homeowner's ornamental trees destroyed by
contractor); Deblieux v. P.S. & Sons Painting, Inc., 405 So. 2d 600 (La. Ct. App.
1981) (rancher's cattle died from lead poisoning due to defendant's negligence);
Waldrop v. Vistron Corp., 391 So. 2d 1274 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (husband con-
tracted cancer allegedly as result of contact with chemicals at work). For a more
complete discussion of the bystander problem, see Comment, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress and Bystander Recovery: A New Tort and a New Plaintifffor Ohio, 15 U.
TOL. L. REV. 273 (1983).
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party's injury in the seminal case of Black v. Carrollton Rail-
road. 32 In Black, the plaintiff was a father whose fourteen
year-old son had been a passenger on the defendant's
regularly scheduled train between Carrollton and New
Orleans.3 3 A switchman employed by the railroad left a
switch out of place which caused the car carrying the boy
to topple.3 4 Both of the boy's legs were broken. 35 The
father brought suit under articles 1934 and 2315 to re-
cover the medical and surgical costs incurred in treating
the boy and the costs related to the father's neglect of his
business while caring for the boy. 6 The jury awarded
$10,000 in damages to the father. On appeal, the
Lousisana Supreme Court reduced the damage award to
$5000.38
The supreme court found that the plaintiff proved ac-
tual damages of $2500 and that the prospective probable
damage could be estimated at an additional $2500.39 The
court observed that the jury seemed to have taken the par-
ent's shock, anxiety and solicitude into account when
computing damages.40 The court was not disposed to al-
low "vindictive" or punitive damages to a relative of the
sufferer, but was careful to distinguish anxiety awards to
the victim himself.4 The court indicated that had the
award been to the boy the court might not have reduced
the award.42
32 10 La. Ann. *33 (1855).
3 Id. at *37.
34 Id.
35 Id.
.1 Id. Today's article 1934 was article' 1928 in Louisiana's Civil Code of 1855.
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1934 (West 1977)(Louisiana renumbered article 1934
effective January 1, 1985 to LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art 1998-99 (West Supp. 1985);
Today's article 2315 was article 2294 in Louisiana's Civil Code of 1855. LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1984).




4 Id. "[W~e do not understand the object of the law to be, the punishment of
an offending party for having been the cause of unpleasant emotions in the family
. . . of the party offended." Id.
42 Id. "In that case, the bodily pain and suffering, the deformity of person, the
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356 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
Some fifty years after Black, in 1906, the Louisiana
Supreme Court reiterated its stance against anxiety
awards to bystanders. In Sperier v. Ott,4 3 a mother wit-
nessed the unlawful arrest of her two sons, aged thirteen
and fourteen." The incarceration of her sons so
"shocked and affected" her that it became necessary to
place her in a mental hospital.45 She died eleven days
later.46 The plaintiff father, on behalf of himself and his
sons, sought damages for the mother's wrongful death,
her medical and funeral expenses, her physical and
mental suffering and her mental anguish over the arrest of
her sons.47 The father also sought exemplary damages
for the unlawful arrest of his sons. 48 The trial court dis-
missed the father's petition for failure to state a cause of
action.49
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the cause of action for unlawful arrest but affirmed the
dismissal of the claims arising out of the mother's mental
anguish over the unlawful arrest. 50 The supreme court re-
lied on Black for their denial of the mental anguish
claim.5 ' Writing for the court, Judge Land recognized
that the line which they were drawing was an arbitrary
one.52 Thus, Louisiana law was clear by the early 1900's:
a person had no right to recover for mental anguish suf-
diminished capacity for laborious exertion, might reasonably justify damages of
the class called vindictive or exemplary,..." Id.
43 116 La. 1087, 41 So. 323 (1906).
4 41 So. at 323-24.
45 Id.





5 Id. (quoting Black, 10 La. Ann. at *42 (Slidell, C.J., dissenting)). ChiefJudge
Slidell agreed that Black's father should not recover for mental anguish over his
son's injuries. This dissent concerned insufficient evidence of business losses.
Black, 10 La. Ann. at *41.
5 41 So. 2d 324. "Moreover, let us bear in mind the difficulty which would
result from recognizing the mental suffering of the third party as an element of
damages. Where is any but arbitrary limit to be found in extending its benefit."
Id. (quoting Black, 10 La. Ann. at *41 (Slidell, C.J., dissenting)).
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fered solely as a result of another person's injuries.5 3
In wrongful death cases, Louisiana has allowed parents
to recover for the loss of a deceased child's affection since
at least 1901.4 In the 1908 case of Bourg v. Brownell-Drews
Lumber Co., 55 the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed a fa-
ther's right of recovery for the death of his son but re-
duced the size of the award.56 The action in Bourg was
brought under articles 1934 and 2315, as was the action
in Black.57 In Bourg, a father's 14 year-old son was killed in
the lumber yard where the boy was working.58 The father
had agreed to his son's employment upon an understand-
ing with the foreman that the boy was not to work around
the engine or any other dangerous machinery. 59 The fa-
ther claimed damages for losing his son's service and soci-
ety and for his sorrow over the untimely death of his
son.60 The trial court awarded $15,000 to the father.6 '
The lumber company appealed to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, arguing that the lad had been injured be-
cause of his own imprudence and that no employment
" See supra notes 32-51 and accompanying text. The last time the Louisiana
Supreme Court addressed the issue of "bystander" mental anguish was in Kauf-
man v. Clark, 141 La. 316, 75 So. 65 (1917). In that case, the defendant had had
sexual relations with the plaintiffs daughter which caused the plaintiff to suffer
"great humiliation, shame, mental anguish, and degradation." Id. at 66. The
court rejected the plaintiffs claim, stating that "[wie have never had any law
which authorized one to recover damages for injuries to his feelings, as a conse-
quence of injury sustained by another, still living, whether in his person, charac-
ter, or feelings." Id. A similar case, heard by the Louisiana Court of Appeals in
1979, also denied recovery to the mother of a rape victim. Brauninger v. Ducote,
381 So. 2d 1246 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (minor daughter raped by the defendant's
son). In Brauninger, the court criticized Louisiana's position on the matter, but felt
compelled to deny recovery until the supreme court changed its position. Id. at
1248.
See LeBlanc v. Sweet, 107 La. 355, 31 So. 766 (1901) (negligence of defend-
ant caused death of sixteen-year old). The court stated that "[parents] might rea-
sonably have expected a continuation . . . of the filial and kindly offices which the
deceased . . . owed to her parents." Id. at 773.
5 120 La. 1009, 45 So. 972 (1908).
56 45 So. at 978-79.
57 Id. at 976; see Black, 10 La.Ann. at *33; see also supra notes 24 & 36.
45 So. at 974.
59 Id.
- See id. at 978-79.
6) Id. at 976.
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contract requiring the boy to be kept from dangerous ma-
chinery existed.62 The supreme court reduced the dam-
age award to $5,000.63 The court concluded that not only
were mental anguish damages appropriate in wrongful
death cases64 but that (i) injury to feelings is an element
of actual rather than punitive damages, and (ii) "articles
1934 and 2315 of the [Louisiana] Civil Code are broad
enough to authorize the recovery . . . for mental suffer-
ing inflicted upon one person by the negligent killing of
another." 65
In cases other than bystander tort cases Louisiana
courts recognize that breach of a duty owed by the de-
fendant to the plaintifP 6 combined with the foreseeability
of harm arising from that breach6 7 forms the fundamental
base upon which damages may be awarded. 68 If the de-
fendant breaches a duty to the plaintiff, damages for fore-
seeable mental anguish may be recovered by the plaintiff
despite the absence of any physical injury. 69 For example,
the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed recovery for mental
anguish arising out of a breach of contract in the 1903
case of Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co. 70 In that case, the
defendant telegraph company failed to promptly transmit
and deliver a telegram informing a mother of her son's
serious illness and impending death. 7' The trial court
rendered judgment for the mother and awarded damages
62 Id. at 974.
-s Id. at 979.
- Id. at 978.
65 Id. at 977. Statute has been renumbered see supra notes 26 & 28.
Id. at 979.
67 See, e.g., Todd v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 219 So. 2d 538 (La. Ct. App.
1969) (decedent's heart attack caused by mental distress was not a foreseeable
result of negligent collision with paiked car). But see Speight v. Southern Farm
Bureau Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 485 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (plaintiff's anguish was a
foreseeable result of negligently driving into plaintiffis house).
8s See supra note 67; see also, e.g., Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d
620 (1972)(defendant could not have foreseen that a third person would move his
ladder so as to create a hazard to the plaintiff).
- Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
70 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903).
7 1 34 So. at 91.
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of $250.72 The Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court and dismissed the case for failure to state a
cause of action.73
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals, holding that there are cases in which damages
may be assessed without calculating pecuniary loss. 74 The
supreme court found no good reason why mental pain
and suffering could not be a basis for breach of contract
damages and remanded the appeal for further determina-
tion on the merits. 75 The court found authority for its de-
cision directly in articles 1934 and 2315 after tracing their
origins back to the Code Napoleon.76 Thus, the court
suggested that a plaintiff may recover for mental anguish
occasioned by the injuries of a third party if the defend-
ant's breach of an independent duty owed to the plaintiff
is the cause of the plaintiffs mental anguish.7 7
More recently, in Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. ,78
the Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the principle that
breach of an independent duty constitutes sufficient cause
for awarding damages for mental anguish.79 In that case,
an exterminator placed poison in the Hollands' home.8 °
The Hollands' minor son ate some of the poison and be-
came ill."' The exterminator was unable to identify the
poison he had used for some hours after being asked for
that information. 2 The Hollands claimed damages for





76 id. at 92. Statute has been renumbered see supra notes 26 & 28.
77 See, e.g., id. at 93.
78 135 So. 2d 145 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
71 Id. Other Louisiana Court of Appeals circuits have interpreted Holland as
being limited to breach of contract actions. See, e.g., Brauninger v. DuCote, 381
So. 2d 1246, 1247 n.l (La. Ct. App. 1979); LaPlace v. Minks, 174 So. 2d 895 (La.
Ct. App. 1965).
80 The exterminator placed the poison in the home as part of a regular service
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son, and (ii) for their worry over his health.83 The trial
court dismissed the Holland's claim for mental anguish
damages for failure to state a cause of action.84 The jury
later found that the exterminator had not been negligent
in placing the poison and thus denied the physical injury
claim.8 5
The Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal
of the mental anguish claim.86 In allowing the Hollands'
claim for mental anguish over the illness of their son, the
court of appeals stated that Louisiana courts have "con-
sistently permitted recovery in such cases provided . ..
the worry and anguish for which damages are sought [are]
occasioned by the breach of a duty owed [to the] plaintiff
by [the] defendant, and provided the recovery is not pred-
icated solely upon [the] breach of duty owed a party other
than [the] plaintiff."'87 The court of appeals decided that
the Hollands' mental anguish was a reasonably foresee-
able result of the exterminator's breach of its contractual
duty.88 The Holland court was careful to point out, how-
ever, that in the absence of a breach of a primary legal
duty owed directly to the plaintiff by the defendant, the
rule in Black would apply.8 9 The court also cautioned
against extending liability in favor of third persons whom
the defendant has no reason to know were endangered. 90
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, the arbi-
trary limit mentioned by Judge Slidell in Black9' had been
redefined in Louisiana law. If a plaintiffs loved one was
fortunate enough to live, plaintiffs mental anguish over
the loved one's injuries was not compensable unless the
a3 Id. at 148.
- Id. at 147.
85 Id.
I d. at 159.
87 Id. at 157.
88 Id.
' Id. at 158; see supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
- Id. The court used guests as an example of persons who might be outside
the foreseeability range and compared them to spectators. Id.
91 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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defendant owed an independent duty to plaintiff.92 Con-
versely, if the victim died, plaintiffs mental anguish over
the loved one's death was compensable.93
C. The Impact and Zone-of-Danger Rules
At the turn of the century, the "impact rule" was the
majority doctrine for awarding mental anguish damages. 94
Under the "impact rule," a plaintiff may not recover for
mental anguish relating to an event unless some observa-
ble physical injury has also been suffered. 95 The impact
requirement was believed to guarantee the genuineness
of the psychic injury.96
The rationale supporting the impact requirement is
grounded in fears of fraud97 and unlimited litigation.98
The existence and cause of mental anguish injury is diffi-
cult to prove conclusively,99 as is the foreseeability of
emotional harm arising out of a negligent act. 0 0 These
difficulties are present whether the plaintiff is a "direct"
or bystander victim.' 0' The "impact rule" has been over-
92 See supra notes 32-42 and 69-89 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, D. AXELROD & R. GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES IN
TORT ACTIONS §§ 5.21-22 (1984)[hereinafter cited as DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS].
95 P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 363-64 (1984)[hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS].
Impact "has been found to mean any physical contact, however slight." Id. See,
e.g., Mortor v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke);
Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga.App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (horse
"evacuating his bowels" into plaintiff's lap); Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180
Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) (a slight blow).
91 Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). The case of
Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) is frequently cited
as a typical opinion of the era on the subject of mental anguish damages. Id.
97 Blackwell v. Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293, 1295 (La. Ct. App. 1983). For a good
discussion of the arguments against recovery, see Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386
Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982)(suit by daughters of women who took DES to
prevent miscarriages who now have a statistically higher probability of cancer).
93 See Blackwell, 436 So. 2d at 1293 (father had no right to damages for mental
anguish over child's birth defects due to medical malpractice: breach of duty to
mother, however, did permit recovery of mental anguish damages).
SId. at 1295.
1oo Id.
, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 94, at § 5.13.
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whelmingly rejected by the courts because of these diffi-
culties, except possibly in bystander cases.1 0 2
Louisiana has rejected the "impact" rule for both by-
stander and non-bystander claims. 10 3  In Smith v.
Manchester Insurance and Indemnity Co.,104 which has a by-
stander element, Milton Smith and his granddaughter
were out for a motorcycle ride on Thanksgiving. 0 5 A tax-
icab ran a stop sign and hit the motorcycle. 06 Mr. Smith
suffered severe injuries from which he died sixteen days
later. 0 7 The granddaughter received only minor physical
injuries but she suffered substantial mental anguish both
from the accident and from witnessing her grandfather's
fatal injuries.' 0 8 The trial court awarded the grand-
daughter $7500 in damages which included $6500 for
anguish over her grandfather's death.'0 9 The Louisiana
Court of Appeals amended the granddaughter's award to
allow $1000 for mental anguish arising from the girl's
personal injuries but denied the award for mental anguish
suffered as a result of seeing her grandfather gravely in-
jured. 110 Thus, despite the fact that the defendant's negli-
gence caused an impact to both plaintiffs in a single
accident, one plaintiff was not allowed to recover for
mental anguish over the injuries of the other.
As the "impact rule" was abandoned by most courts, it
was replaced by the "zone of danger" rule."' Under this
102 id. at § 5.22[l]. Five jurisdictions still adhere to the impact rule. Payton, 437
N.E.2d at 176 n.6.
103 See Cooper v. Christensen, 212 So. 2d 154 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (defendant's
car crashed into plaintiffs house causing mental anguish despite absence of physi-
cal impact). See also cases cited in Todd v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 219 So. 2d
538, 542-43 (La. Ct. App. 1969); but cf. Stone, Louisiana Tort Doctrine.- Emotional
Distress Occasioned by Another's Peril, 48 TUL. L. REV. 782, 83 (1974)(recovery for
fright may be had without physical injury).
1- 299 So. 2d 517 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
05 Id. at 520.
106 Id.
107 Id.
,os id. at 524.
'm Id.
,10 Id.
|, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, supra note 94, at § 5.23.
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theory a bystander may recover for mental anguish over
the injuries of a third party suffered while the bystander
reasonably fears for his or her own safety and well-be-
ing.112 This doctrine is similar to the rule adopted by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts which would allow recov-
ery for mental anguish suffered by the plaintiff in situa-
tions where the defendant has created an unreasonable
risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff." 3
Louisiana courts have rejected the "zone of danger"
rule in bystander cases." 4 In Warr v. Kemp" 5 a man and
his pregnant wife had an automobile accident. 1 6 Mrs.
Warr suffered a "whiplash" injury; Mr. Warr suffered no
physical injury.' '7 The trial court awarded $600 in dam-
ages for Mrs. Warr's anxiety over a possible miscarriage,
$1500 in general damages to Mrs. Warr and $300 to Mr.
Warr for his mental anguish over his wife's possible mis-
carriage." 8 The Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed the
award of mental anguish damages to Mr. Warr, who was
112 PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 95, at 365.
I's The Restatement rule is:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another,
he is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily
harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that, his conduct involved an unreasona-
ble risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the
harm or peril of a third person, and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized that the distress,
if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to illness or
bodily harm of another which is caused by emotional distress arising
solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the negligence of
the actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm
to the other.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 313, comment d (1966). See id. § 436, caveat,
comments f, g, h (1965). See also id. § 435 (1965).
114 See, e.g., Dudley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 255 So. 2d 462 (La. Ct.
App. 197 l)(father denied recovery for mental anguish over son's injury); Sabatier
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So. 2d 594 (La. Ct. App. 1966)(daughter denied recov-
ery for mental anguish over father's injury in an automobile accident where both
were passengers).
- 208 So. 2d 570 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
116 Id. at 571.
117 Id.
Ila Id.
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clearly in the "zone of danger,"" 9 and affirmed the award
to Mrs. Warr. 120
D. Dillon v. Legg - California Allows Bystander Recovery
Prior to 1968, bystander recovery for mental anguish
over the injuries of another was generally denied except
in those jurisdictions where the "zone of danger" analysis
was extended 12 1 or where an independent cause of action
could be sustained. 122 In 1968, the California Supreme
Court decided Dillon v. Legg.' 23 In Dillon, Erin Dillon was
run over by a car in full view of her mother and sister.1
24
Her mother sued on behalf of herself and Erin's sister for
their "great emotional disturbance and shock" suffered as
a result of seeing the accident. 2 5 The sister had been
within the "zone of danger" at the time of the accident
and the mother was nearby. 126 The trial court granted a
summary judgment against the mother because she was
outside the "zone of danger" at the time of the accident
and thus had no cause of action. 127 The California
Supreme Court reversed the trial court because the
supreme court was unable to justify denying an award to
the mother while permitting recovery by the sister "be-
cause of a happenstance that the sister was a few yards
closer to the accident."' 128
The Dillon court rejected the "zone of danger" and "im-
, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 313(2) comment d (1965)(adopting the
"zone of danger" rule). The "zone of danger" encompasses the area in proximity
to the accident where the plaintiff actually fears for his own safety. Id.
12o 208 So. 2d at 572.
121 PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 95, at 365-66; DAMAGES IN TORT
ACTIONS, supra note 94, at § 5.20.
122 See, e.g., Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. Ct. App.
1961) (parents allowed to recover for mental anguish over son's health when ex-
terminator breached duty to know composition of poison used). For further dis-
cussion see supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
12- 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
124 441 P.2d at 914.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 915.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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pact" concepts because of their theoretical inconsis-
tency 129 and turned to an analysis of duty. 130  After
reviewing the progress of negligence liability through the
California courts and refuting most of the major argu-
ments against bystander mental anguish damages' 3 ' the
court returned to a fundamental principle: defendants
should be liable for injuries which are a foreseeable result
of their negligent actions. 3 2 The court thus held that if
the risk of either physical or emotional injury is a foresee-
able consequence of the defendant's act, the defendant
will be liable for the damage which results. 133
The Dillon court stressed that the ordinary man stan-
dard should be used to determine the reasonable foresee-
ability of harm on a case-by-case basis.134 The factors to
be taken into account include:
(1) Whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the
accident, as contrasted with one who was a distance away
from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional
impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporane-
ous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learn-
ing of the accident from others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related,
as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the
presence of only a distant relationship. 35
Having thus circumscribed the doctrine, the court allowed
the mother and the sister to recover for their mental
anguish. '3 6
129 Id. at 915-16.
,so Id. at 916. For a complete discussion of duty in tort contexts, see M. SHAPO,
THE DuTY To ACT (1977).
- Dillon, 441 P.2d at 917-20.
12 Id. at 920. Louisiana courts have traditionally used a foreseeability analysis.
See, e.g., Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972) (defendant
could not have foreseen that a third person would move his ladder so as to create
a hazard to the plaintiff); Blackwell v. Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293 (La. Ct. App.
1983) (scrutinizing denial of bystander mental anguish damages).
13s Dillon, 441 P.2d at 919-20.
34 d. at 920-21.
-5 Id. at 920.
136 Id. at 925. Louisiana has not adopted Dillon. In fact, diligent research re-
365
366 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [50
E. The Rescue Doctrine - An Independent Duty to the
Rescuer
The law imposes a duty on all persons to avoid conduct
which creates an unreasonable risk of damage to other
persons or property. 37 This duty extends to those known
to be depending upon the actor's conduct and to those
who are foreseeably endangered by the actor's con-
duct. 3 8 Rescuers who risk their own lives or safety to
protect the interests of others are foreseeable and are to
be encouraged. 39 Thus, there is a duty owed by all actors
to those rescuers who would dash in to save the lives or
property endangered by the actor's conduct. 140
Ordinarily, a person who acts in such a way as to unrea-
sonably increase the risk of his own injury in a given situa-
tion can be precluded from recovering for all or part of
his injuries for one or more reasons:' 4' first, because the
person had assumed the risk of his own injury, or second,
because the person had been the contributory or super-
seding cause of his own injury.1 42 Under the "rescue doc-
trine," however, a person who attempts to rescue a
person or property from peril caused by a third party can-
not be charged with either assumption of the risk or con-
tributory negligence. 43 The rescuer will be allowed to
recover for his injuries so long as the interest he was seek-
ing to protect exceeded the probable gravity of the res-
cuer's injury.'4 4 Thus, an actor who has negligently
endangered the property or safety of another will be held
liable for injuries sustained by a rescuer so long as the
vealed only one reported Louisiana case that even referred to Dillon and its analy-
sis. See Blackwell v. Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293, 1297 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
137 PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 95, at 307-10.
138 Id.
,sq Id. at 307.
,40 Id. at 308.
14, Id. at 451.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 308-10. Gambino v. Lubel, 190 So. 2d 152 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (po-
liceman allowed to recover for injuries suffered while assisting motorist).
144 PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 95, at 308-10.
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rescue attempt is not reckless or rash. 145
Louisiana recognizes the rescue doctrine. In Lynch v.
Fisher, 146 for example, the plaintiff rescued a driver and his
gravely injured wife from a burning car.' 47 The car had
hit the defendant's negligently parked truck.' 48  During
the rescue, the rescuer found a gun and handed it to the
driver who was delirious.' 49 The driver shot the rescuer
in the ankle.' 50 The trial court dismissed the rescuer's suit
for failing to state a cause of action.' 5' The Louisiana
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and
held that (i) the proximate cause of a rescuer's injuries is
the negligence which caused the rescuer to act,' 52 and (ii)
a rescuer is not restrained by the doctrines of contribu-
tory negligence and last clear chance. 153 The case was
then remanded to determine damages.1 54
Thus, in Louisiana, the law concerning recovery for
mental anguish damages is well-defined and consistently
145 Id. See Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So. 2d 513 (La. Ct. App. 1948) (rescuer shot by
gun he gave to rescuee was allowed to recover physical injury damages).
46 Lynch, 34 So. 2d at 513.




151 Id. at 514.
52 Id. at 515.
153 Id. at 516.
- Id. at 518. The fact that the plaintiff is paid to do rescue work will not defeat
recovery as a "rescuer" in Louisiana. In Gambino v. Lubel, a policeman stopped
to investigate an automobile that was stopped in the middle of a street. 190 So.
2d 152, 154 (La. Ct. App. 1966). The driver of the car was unconscious because
of a diabetic insulin reaction. Id. The driver aroused as the policeman was trying
to aid him and hit the accelerator of the still-running car, causing an accident. Id.
The driver argued that the policeman had been contributorily negligent because
he had failed to turn off the engine. Id. at 156. The court held that the officer was
a rescuer and could not be contributorily negligent "merely because he failed to
make the wisest choice." Id. at 157. The court noted that the policeman was
under a duty to investigate and decided that "he was not a volunteer rescuer
which would seem to fit more the ordinary conception of a rescue situation, but
simply because he was performing his duty would not remove him from being
classified as a 'rescuer'." Id. at 156. The court stated that "[t]he cause of an in-
jury to a rescuer is the fault which created the peril to those whom he attempts to
aid." Id. at 157. See also Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Service of Texas, Inc., 235
F.Supp. 97, 109 (W.D. La. 1964).
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applied. To recover for mental anguish because of the in-
juries of a third person, the plaintiff must first show that
the defendant owed him a duty. 155 Such a duty must be
owed directly to the plaintiff. 156 A negligent defendant
owes a direct duty to all persons who foreseeably may be
injured by his conduct, including rescuers who come to
the aid of persons who have been endangered by the de-
fendant's acts.' 57 Second, the plaintiff must show that his
mental anguish is a foreseeable result of the defendant's
negligent acts.15 8 The plaintiff need not suffer a physical
impact, or be within a "zone of danger" at the time of his
injury, or suffer any physical symptoms to recover for
mental anguish injuries. 159 All that is required is that the
plaintiff's mental anguish be a foreseeable result of the
defendant's acts and that the cause of plaintiff's anguish
not be any injuries to a third person.
II. LECONTE V. PAN AMERICAN
The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
denied LeConte's and Engman's claim for mental anguish
suffered as a result of handling the crash victims' bod-
ies.' 60 LeConte and Engman appealed to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in LeConte v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.16' The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 62
The Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana prohibits recovery
155 See supra notes 66-90 and accompanying text.
156 Id.
157 See supra notes 148-154 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
15" See supra notes 103-120 and accompanying text.
16 736 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984).
16, Id.
162 Id. Under the Erie Doctrine, a federal court sitting in a diversity action is
obligated to apply the substantive law of the state in which the federal court is
located. C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 55-60 (1983). The federal court
is allowed to consider any factors which a state court could use to determine the
exact position of the state law and whether a change in state law is indicated. Id.
at 373. In LeConte, however, the plaintiffs made no attempt to distinguish their
claim from the Black line of cases. LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1021. Thus, the Fifth
Circuit was bound by Louisiana's previous decisions. Id. See also C. WRIGHT, LAw
OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 58-59 (1983).
[50
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for mental anguish occasioned by the injuries of a third
party except in two well-defined circumstances. 163 The
first exception is when the cause of action arises under
Louisiana's wrongful death statute which allows certain
close relatives to recover for their personal anguish over
the wrongfully caused death of a loved one.' 64 This ex-
ception is illustrated by Bourg v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co.,
where a father recovered for his sorrow over his son's
death. 65  The second exception occurs in situations
where the defendant's breach of an independent duty
owed to the plaintiff aggravates the plaintiffs mental
anguish. 66 This exception is illustrated by Holland v. St.
Paul Mercury Insurance Co. 167 where an exterminator
breached his duty to know the composition of a poison he
was spreading around the Hollands' home.168 The exter-
minator's breach of his duty aggravated the Hollands'
anguish over the health of their son, who had eaten some
of the poison.169 The Fifth Circuit noted that Louisiana
had not adopted an exception to their general rule that
denies recovery for mental anguish occasioned by the in-
juries of a third party for cases where the mental anguish
is accompanied by objective physical symptoms. 70 Thus,
the fact that LeConte and Engman were suffering objec-
tive symptoms was irrelevant to the vitality of their claim.
LeConte and Engman relied upon a Missouri case, Bass
v. Nooney Co. 171 to support their claim for damages. 72 In
Bass a woman claimed she suffered severe emotional dis-
tress from being trapped in an elevator.17 3 The Missouri
Supreme Court reviewed the progress of Missouri law
163 LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1021; see supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
6 LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1021; see supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
165 Bourg, 45 So. at 972, 976-77; see supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
- LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1021.
167 135 So. 2d 145 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
- Id. at 145; see supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
,69 Holland, 135 So. 2d at 147.
170 LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1021.
1,' 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983).
172 LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1021.
17s Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 766.
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concerning mental anguish damages and then adopted
the position that the woman's emotional distress should
be compensated so long as the damage was foreseeable
and measureable.' 74  LeConte and Engman sought to
analogize their situation to that of the woman trapped in
the elevator and claimed that they were in peril.' 75 The
Fifth Circuit, however, held that LeConte and Engman
were purely bystanders outside any zone of danger cre-
ated by Pan Am's negligence. 176 Bass, therefore, did not
apply. 177 Moreover, the court probably recognized the
historical bias against awards for mental anguish suffered
as a consequence of injuries to third persons and was un-
willing to allow an award where it was clear that Louisiana
courts would not.17 8
LeConte and Engman also argued that they could re-
cover under the precepts of the rescue doctrine.' 79 The
Fifth Circuit assumed arguendo that LeConte and Engman
came within the rescue doctrine but concluded that they
would still be precluded from recovering. 18 0 The court
held that Louisiana does not recognize a cause of action
for mental anguish suffered as a result of another's in-
jury.' Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit denied recovery.
III. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit, constrained by the Erie Doctrine and
129 years of Louisiana decisions, could not have arrived at
any other decision. Louisiana courts have followed
Black' 8 2 despite their disagreement with its policy and its
174 Id. at 767-74.
175 LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1021.
176 Id. This finding seems unusual because of newspaper reports of the fires
and explosions which followed the crash. The fires were not extinguished quickly
enough to eliminate potential harm to the rescue workers. N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
1982, at 1, col. 1.
,77 LeConte, 736 F.2d at 1021.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1021 n.4.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Blackwell v. Oser, 436 So. 2d 1293, 1294 (La. Ct. App. 1983). The only
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theoretical inconsistency. 8 3 Thus, LeConte v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc. was correctly decided. Can it be said
though that LeConte was rightly decided?
In the sixteen years since Dillon was decided, only one
Louisiana appellate court has referred to its analysis. 8 4
One reason for this may be the unique nature of Louisi-
ana's statute based legal system.'8 5 Another reason may
be that Louisiana courts have traditionally used foresee-
ability analysis, as did Dillon, to determine which injuries
to compensate. 8 6 In most situations, psychic injuries are
treated on equal footing with physical injuries. 8 7 Thus, a
plaintiff may recover for mental anguish suffered as a re-
sult of negligent or intentional injury to his property,18
his reputation, °9 or, in proper circumstances, his child.1 0'
As a general policy, LeConte's and Engman's injuries
should be compensated if Pan Am breached its duty to
maverick cases (none of which have been overturned, but all of which involve
pregnant women) have been: Jordon v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 90 So. 2d 531 (La. Ct.
App. 1956); Champagne v. Hearty, 76 So. 2d 453 (La. Ct. App. 1954); and Va-
lence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1951).
183 Blackwell, 436 So. 2d at 1298-99. "[S]uch an absolute bar obliterates the
importance of 'foreseeability of harm,' and this does violence to our long-held
notion of 'duty.' " Id. at 1298.
-84 The lone Louisiana appellate court to have cited Dillon is the Louisiana
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, in Blackwell, 436 So. 2d at 1297 (La. Ct. App.
1983). For a discussion of Dillon see supra notes 121-138 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (1972);
Todd v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 219 So. 2d 538, 544 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
I'l Dawson v. James H. Stuart and Deaton, Inc., 437 So. 2d 974, 976 (La. Ct.
App. 1983) (mental anguish during an ordeal is legally compensable); Richard v.
Guillory, 392 So. 2d 777 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (depression caused by accident is a
compensable item of damages).
188 See, e.g., Pearce v. L.J. Earnest, Inc., 411 So. 2d 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1982)(or-
namental trees negligently destroyed by contractor); Deblieux v. P.S. & Sons
Painting, Inc., 405 So. 2d 600 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (cattle killed by negligent han-
dling of a lead-based paint).
189 See, e.g., Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903)(wedding dress not
delivered on time); Quina v. Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944)(creditor sent
letter complaining of overdue bills to plaintiffs employer).
-8o See, e.g., Holland, supra notes 78-90 and 167-168 and accompanying text (par-
ent's anguish over child's consumption of poison extended due to exterminator's
failure to know composition of poison). Bourg v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co.,
120 La. 1009, 45 So. 2d 972 (1908) (wrongful death of child working in lumber
yard).
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prevent their injury. 9 1 The critical, though not always
controlling, element in assessing the breach of a duty
owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is the foreseeability of
the harm which could result from the defendant's negli-
gent act. 192 Had the Fifth Circuit used a pure foreseeabil-
ity analysis, as the Holland court did, 93 LeConte and
Engman might have had their chance before the jury. If a
negligent act causes a major air disaster, rescue workers
will foreseeably arrive at the crash site before all risks of
personal injury are extinguished. The stress reactions of
such rescue workers are well known.' 94 Particularly in
cases where rescue workers spend hours combing
through dozens of dismembered bodies, the likelihood of
some psychic injury must be reasonably foreseeable. As-
suming that the extent and cause of the injury is provable,
the damages should be compensable.
LeConte and Engman, however, would be unlikely to
recover for their injuries in any jurisdiction given their cir-
cumstances. Some states would reject their claim be-
cause they were professional rescue workers. 95 Other
states would reject their claim because they suffered no
impact.' 9 6 Even states which have adopted Dillon v.
Legg19 7 would deny recovery. Using a Dillon analysis, a
court could find that LeConte and Engman were suffi-
ciently close to the scene of the accident and that the inju-
ries were sufficiently linked to a contemporaneous
perception of the accident to support a damage award.
19, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 95, at § 53.
,92 Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972); PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 95, at §§ 42-43.
- Holland, 135 So. 2d at 155.
194 See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, When Cops Can't Cope, September 14, 1981, at 59.
195 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc., 203 Neb. 684, 279 N.W.2d 855
(1979); Gillespie v. Washington, 395 A.2d 18 (D.C. 1978); Black Industries, Inc. v.
Emco Helicopters, Inc., 19 Wash. App. 697, 577 P.2d 610 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
'1, Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176 n.6 (1982). Five
jurisdictions still adhere to the impact rule. Id. But see Bass, supra notes 171-177
and accompanying text.
197 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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Thus, the first two tests of Dillon could be met. l 9' The
third test, however, that LeConte and Engman be closely
related to the victims, could not be met.' 9 9 A Dillon state,
therefore, would deny recovery.
The Dillon tests were developed to limit the class of by-
stander plaintiffs who could recover mental anguish dam-
ages.20  As Judge Slidell suggested in 1855,201 however,
the line at which the court or the legislature cuts off recov-
ery is arbitrary. Louisiana faced this decision squarely in
Holland.2 °2 In that case, recovery for mental anguish over
the injuries of a third party was limited by a sound fore-
seeability test. 20 3 The test in Holland is whether the plain-
tiffs mental anguish over the injuries of a third person is a
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's breach of the
duty he owed to the plaintiff.2 0 4 The mental anguish must
be a parasite to the breach of duty owed to the plaintiff.
20 5
Using this analysis, LeConte and Engman might not have
recovered either. LeConte's mental anguish could be a
foreseeable result of Pan Am's breach of duty to him, but
it might not be foreseeable that his anguish would be
greater than the anguish he would have suffered from
merely observing the accident rather than participating in
the rescue. In other words, LeConte's anguish was not a
parasite to the breach of duty; LeConte's injury was the
breach of duty. As such it cannot be compensated under
Louisiana law.
LeConte v. Pan American World Airways20 6 is important, not
because it changes any rule of law or because a particu-
larly appealing plaintiff has been grievously wronged, but
198 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. For a list of cases which have
adopted Dillon, see DAMAGES IN TORT ACTiONS supra note 94 at § 5.20-.21.
1- See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
200 Dillon, 441 P.2d at 919.
201 See supra note 52.





20 736 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984).
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rather because LeConte forces us to reexamine the ration-
ality of our line-drawing. The Black rule is not particularly
compelling in a theoretical sense, but Louisiana has ap-
plied it consistently.2 °7 As various jurisdictions rely more
heavily upon a foreseeability analysis, however, the day
may come when plaintiffs like LeConte and Engman will
be allowed to recover for their injuries. One could argue
that LeConte and Engman, as trained trauma profession-
als, should never recover for mental anguish suffered in
the "line of duty," but this argument avoids the question.
Should the passerby, who is often first on the scene, or
the Red Cross or Civil Defense volunteer also be denied
recovery? Training is no guarantee that a person will not
be affected by an extraordinary event. Eventually, we
must examine this question because the trend in the
United States, as in many other jurisdictions, is toward
compensating all foreseeable injuries.2°8
Charles N. Bell
207 See supra note 182.
208 PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 95, at 366.
TORTS P- RE-JUDGMENT AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
- THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND MONTREAL AGREEMENT
PERMIT THE AWARD OF PRE-JUDGMENT AND POST-JUDGMENT
INTEREST IN ADDITION TO THE $75,000 LIABILITY LIMITA-
TION. Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir.
1984).
On June 24, 1975, Eastern Airline's Flight 66, en route
from New Orleans, crashed on its approach to Kennedy
International Airport in New York.' Of the 124 persons
aboard, 113 were killed. One fatality was Barry Joseph
Domangue, the husband of Evelyn H. Domangue and fa-
ther of two children.3
On September 25, 1975, Mrs. Domangue, individually
and on behalf of her two minor children, filed a wrongful
death action against Eastern Airlines (Eastern) in the fed-
eral court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. By order
of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 5 all suits
arising from the air disaster, including Mrs. Domangue's,
were consolidated 6 and transferred to the federal district
Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 334, 335 (E.D. La. 1981). For a
discussion of the cause of the crash see In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy
Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975, 635 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1980).
2 In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975,
407 F. Supp. 244, 245 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976).
- Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 542 F. Supp. 643, 648 (E.D. La. 1982). Barry
Domangue, 29, was on the first leg of a trip to the North Sea, where he was re-
turning to work for several months on a barge as an anchor operator. Id.
, Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 334, 335 (E.D. La. 1981).
5 Eastern Airlines moved that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transfer all of the proceedings to the Eastern District of New York pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1407 (1976) which reads: "When civil actions involving one or more
common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be
transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings."
Id.
6 In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975,
407 F. Supp. 244, 245 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976). At the time the cases were consolidated
there were 37 actions relating to the air disaster which were filed in four federal
district courts. Id.
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court for the Eastern District of New York.7 The panel
stipulated that the federal district court was to coordinate
pre-trial procedures and determine liability.8 The panel
further decided that the issue of damages, unique to each
case, should be tried before the court in which each action
originated.9
In the New York district court Mrs. Domangue, joined
by 14 other plaintiffs,' 0 moved that her claim be consid-
ered under the absolute liability privilege of the Warsaw
Convention and Montreal Agreement." The district
court held the Warsaw Convention applicable to Mrs.
Domangue's suit' 2  and entered summary judgment
I Id. at 246. The Multidistrict Litigation Panel transferred the combined plain-
tiff's suits to the federal district court for the Eastern District of New York because
New York was the site of the crash and the most convenient place for discovery.
Id.
, In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport, 479 F. Supp. 1118,
1121-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). Upon a claim that the crash was caused in part by the
negligence of the air traffic controllers at Kennedy International Airport, the
United States was joined as a defendant pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). The Act provides in pertinent part that the "United
States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims,
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like cir-
cumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive
damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy
Int'l Airport, 479 F. Supp. at 1120-21.
9 In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport, 479 F. Supp. at
1120-21.
I Id. at 1121.
11 Id. The Civil Aeronautics Board, Agreement 18900, Agreement Relating to
Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol (1966),
approved by Civil Aeronautics Board, Order No. E23680 (May 13, 1966), reprinted
in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) and in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Montreal Agreement] is actually a waiver by adhering airlines of the de-
fenses available to them under the original Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat.
3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. The Montreal Agreement pro-
vides in part: "[tihe parties further agree to provide in their tariffs that the Carrier
shall not, with respect to any claim arising out of the death, wounding, or other
bodily injury of a passenger, avail itself of any defense under Article 20(1) of the
[Warsaw] Convention or the [Warsaw] Convention as amended by the [Hague]
Protocol." Montreal Agreement. The absolute liability privilege, however, is not
available to persons who have intentionally or willfully caused damages. Id.
12 There are six conditions for application of the Warsaw Convention and Mon-
treal Agreement: 1) the passenger's travel must be "international" within the
meaning of Article 1 (1) of the Convention (in Domangue's case, his final destina-
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against Eastern as to liability only.' 3
Based upon Eastern's appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the judgment
and remanded the case to the district court on grounds of
procedural error.' 4 Before the New York district court
had a chance to hear the case on remand, however, Mrs.
Domangue and Eastern stipulated to a transfer of the case
back to the federal district court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.' 5 Thus, the parties appeared before the origi-
nal court in which the action had commenced six years
earlier, with liability and damages still undetermined.' 6
tion was outside the United States, and thus he was an "international" traveler);
2) the passenger ticket must be "delivered" according to Article 3 (1) of the Con-
vention (Mr. Domangue, according to evidence introduced by Eastern, received
his ticket on the day prior to departing, thus having sufficient time to purchase
additional insurance to compensate for the limited liability, if necessary); 3) the
ticket must have a statement in ten point type stating that transportation is subject
to the liability limit of the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement (Eastern
produced evidence that the tickets issued to passengers on Flight 66 contained
such a statement); 4) the accident must have occurred while the passenger was on
board or in the course of embarking or disembarking from the aircraft (Mr.
Domangue was a passenger on board Flight 66 when it crashed on its landing
approach); 5) the passenger must not have contributed to the accident (no evi-
dence was introduced to suggest that Mr. Domague contributed to or had any part
in the accident); and 6) the accident must not have been due to the willful miscon-
duct of the airline (although Mrs. Domangue argued that the crash was due to the
willful misconduct of Eastern, her claim was unsupported by any evidence). War-
saw Convention, supra note 11; Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 334,
338-41 (E.D. La. 1981).
is Winbourne v. Eastern Airlines, 479 F. Supp. 1130, 1141 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
The court reserved the issue of damages for the Louisiana district court in which
the case originated. Id.
14 Winbourne v. Eastern Airlines, 632 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 334, 335-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). East-
ern's appeal was based on the district court's entry of summary judgment from the
bench without allowing Eastern the requisite opportunity to submit written oppo-
sition to the motion. Winbourne, 632 F.2d at 223. Before Eastern could make its
appeal to the Second Circuit, the New York district court amended its judgment
allowing Eastern to raise any defenses it might have at the trial for determining
damages. Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 531 F. Supp. at 336. Nevertheless, once
the Second Circuit gained jurisdiction of the case, it reversed the judgment on
grounds of procedural error. Winbourne, 632 F.2d at 223.
15 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 531 F. Supp. at 336-37. The New York dis-
trict court did not oppose the transfer of the case because it felt it would be simply
a procedural matter to reinstate Eastern's liability, because in the court's opinion,
there was no question that the Warsaw Convention applied. Id.
16 Id.
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By this time, Eastern had been found liable in other
cases arising from the crash, but not proceeding under
the absolute liability provision of the Warsaw Conven-
tion.' 7 Because liability had been established and plain-
tiffs in those actions were able to collect unlimited
damages from Eastern, Mrs. Domangue, before offering
proof for her damages, completely reversed her position
and began arguing that the Warsaw Convention and Mon-
treal Agreement were not applicable to her cause of ac-
tion.' 8 Mrs. Domangue contended that her husband was
not aware of the applicability of the Warsaw Convention
to his flight' 9 and that any damages limitation was waived
by Eastern when it entered into a contribution agreement
with the United States. 20 Eastern moved for partial sum-
'7 In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975,
635 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1980). The Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement
did not apply to those plaintiffs representing passengers who were not travelling
internationally. Warsaw Convention, supra note 11, at art. 1; Domangue v. East-
ern Airlines, 531 F. Supp. at 338, 340. Those plaintiffs, therefore, had the burden
of proving that Eastern was negligent, but if they succeeded, the liability of East-
ern would be unlimited. In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport
onJune 24, 1975, 635 F.2d at 70. The plaintiffs proceeded to try the case before
the New York district court and a jury held Eastern liable. Id.
I8 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 531 F. Supp. at 337. Those plaintiffs to whom
the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement applied would be limited in
their recovery against Eastern to a maximum award of $75,000 each, whereas
those plaintiffs ouside the scope of the Convention would be able to recover dam-
ages far in excess of that, provided the damages could be proven. Domangue v.
Eastern Airlines, 542 F. Supp. at 652-55.
,9 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 531 F. Supp. at 338-41.
20o Id. at 341. Mrs. Domangue advanced three arguments as to why the Warsaw
Convention and Montreal Agreement did not apply:
1) The passenger ticket was not "delivered" within the meaning of
Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention. She contended that the page in
the ticket warning that the travel was subject to the Warsaw Conven-
tion could have been torn out inadvertently by a ticket manager.
The claim was dismissed because Mrs. Domangue could not produce
any evidence that such was the case and Eastern was able to
reproduce the type of ticket given to Mr. Domangue which con-
tained an unperforated page with the necessary warning. Id. at 339-
40.
2) There was "willful misconduct" by Eastern in causing the dam-
age and thus the limit of liability is inapplicable according to Article
25 of the Warsaw Convention. The court also dismissed the claim in
the absence of any such evidence. Id. at 341.
3) Eastern waived the damage limitation of the Warsaw Convention
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mary judgment as to the applicability of the Warsaw Con-
vention and Montreal Agreement.2 In the absence of any
genuine issues of fact, the Louisiana district court granted
Eastern's motion.22  Hence, with damages still not liti-
gated, Mrs. Domangue's recovery from Eastern was lim-
ited to $75,000, the limit imposed under the Montreal
Agreement modifying the Warsaw Convention.2 3 Before
Mrs. Domangue could complete her proof of damages,24
Eastern confessed judgment of $75,000 and deposited
that amount in the registry of the court.25
Mrs. Domangue, displeased with the limited recovery
from Eastern, consequently argued in the Louisiana dis-
trict court that she was entitled to collect pre-judgment
and post-judgment interest in addition to the $75,000
award.26 She argued that if the members of the Warsaw
by entering into an agreement with the United States to contribute
60 percent toward settlement or payment of damage awards of
claims not yet settled with the United States. The claim was dis-
missed because the agreement made no mention of the Warsaw
Convention. Furthermore, the limitation of liability of Article 22 of
the Warsaw Convention affects only the rights and remedies avail-
able to the plaintiff and is strictly applicable only to the relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant. It does not affect what defend-
ants may do among themselves. Id. at 341-42.
21 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 531 F. Supp. at 337.
22 Id.; see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
22 Warsaw Convention, supra note 11, as modified by the Montreal Agreement,
supra note 11.
24 The parties stipulated that Louisiana law would control the trial on damages;
consequently, damages were awarded for loss of love, affection, and companion-
ship; loss of support; and funeral expenses. The total judgment for all past and
future damages was $639,446.50. Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 542 F. Supp. at
654.
25 Id. at 645. Because Eastern's liability was limited by the Warsaw Convention
and Montreal Agreement to $75,000, Eastern chose to simply deposit the total
amount into the registry of the court knowing that the damages would obviously
be much greater than that. Id. Thus, the United States, which had earlier stipu-
lated to its liability, was left with the sole burden of defending against Mrs.
Domangue's claim for damages. Id. The only limit to damages recoverable from
the United States was that placed by the court at $2,500,000, the amount origi-
nally sought by Mrs. Domangue. Id. Because the United States would have to pay
any damages above $75,000 and up to a maximum of $2,500,000, it obviously had
a much greater interest than Eastern in trying to mitigate Mrs. Domangue's
damages.
26 Id. at 652. Interest has been defined as "compensation for the use or
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Convention had intended interest to be included as an el-
ement of the $75,000 limit, it would have been specified
in Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention.2 7 Mrs.
Domangue also cited comments by other district court
judges ruling on Warsaw suits arising from the same inci-
dent and awarding interest in addition to the $75,000
limit.2 8 One such judge said "in order to effectuate the
forebearance of money." Rosen v. United States, 288 F.2d 658, 660 (3d Cir.
1976) (holding difference between amount paid by taxpayer on investment certifi-
cate and maturity value realized by the taxpayer constitutes interest). Post-judg-
ment interest is generally calculated from the date final judgment is entered until
payment is made. Gele v. Wilson, 616 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that
post-judgment interest begins accruing on an appealed case only after the case
has been remanded and a final judgment rendered, rather than on the date of the
original trial court judgment). The date at which pre-judgment interest begins
accruing can vary from the date of the tort or breach to the date of judicial de-
mand, depending upon the circumstances surrounding the case. Union Bank of
Benton v. First Nat'l Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 677 F.2d 1074, 1079 (5th Cir. 1982)
(stating that pre-judgment interest may be awarded from the time at which the
measure of recovery, and not necessarily the amount of damages, is fixed by the
conditions existing at the time of the injury); Vallee v. Hyatt Corp., 433 So. 2d
1070, 1075 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (holding under Louisiana law that in tort actions,
interest attaches from the date ofjudicial demand); Commercial Standard Ins. Co.
v. Bryce St. Apts., Ltd., 703 F.2d 904, 909 (5th Cir. 1983) (awarding pre-judgment
interest in contractual setting from date when construction hold backs on projects
financed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development - insured mort-
gages should have been released). In Domangue, the date of the tort was June 24,
1975, and the date of judicial demand was September 25, 1975. Domangue v.
Eastern Airlines, 531 F. Supp. at 335.
27 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 542 F. Supp. at 652. Article 22 of the Warsaw
Convention states:
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical pay-
ments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 11.
28 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 542 F. Supp. at 652-54. Mrs. Domangue re-
ferred to three cases, all concerning the same incident and awarding interest de-
spite being regulated by the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement. Id.
citing Hickey v. Eastern Airlines, No. 76-237F (E.D. La. 1981) (where the judge
said he would allow interest, but the case eventually settled); Dispenza v. Eastern
Airlines, No. 75-2412E (E.D. La. 1982) (where interest was allowed, but without
explanation by the judge); Winbourne v. Eastern Airlines, No. 75-2715C (E.D. La.
1982) (where interest was allowed with the judge explaining that one of the pur-
poses of the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement is prompt recovery to
the passenger and to disallow the award of interest would frustrate that purpose).
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purposes of the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agree-
ment, plaintiff must be awarded pre-judgment and post-
judgment interest. ' 29 The district court, however, ac-
cepted Eastern's argument that the purpose of the Con-
vention is to protect airlines by establishing a limit to their
liability, and anything in excess of that limit would be con-
trary to the intent of the adhering nations.3 0 The district
court considered interest an element of damages, and be-
cause the Convention expressly limits damages to
$75,000, the court held that any amount above $75,000 is
not recoverable. 31 This holding by the district court
prompted Mrs. Domangue's appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, contesting the in-
terpretation of the Warsaw Convention and denial of in-
terest on the judgment against Eastern. HELD: Reversed,
The Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement permit
the award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest in
addition to the $75,000 liability limitation. Domangue v.
Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984).
I. A BALANCE OF OBJECTIVES
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Domangue v. East-
ern Airlines stated that in order to resolve the issue
presented it must "balance" the objectives sought to be
accomplished by the drafters of the Warsaw Convention
with the principles supporting the award of interest on
judgments.32 On one end of the scale the court saw the
need to maintain a fixed and definite level of liability, a
primary objective of the Warsaw Convention. 3 Weighing
on the other end of the scale was the principle behind
awarding interest: encouraging speedy compensation of
damages and maximizing the recovery of injured parties
29 Winbourne v. Eastern Airlines, No. 75-2715C (E.D. La. 1982), cited in
Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 542 F. Supp. at 653.
30 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 542 F. Supp. at 653.
'1 Id.
12 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1984).
" Id. at 262. See infra notes 36-98 and accompanying text.
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or their survivors.3 4 The appeal in Domangue brought to
issue whether the objectives of the Warsaw Convention
can be preserved while also accommodating the principles
underlying the awarding of interest.3 5 This casenote will
examine the development of these two objectives and
their proclaimed reconciliation by the Fifth Circuit.
A. Defining the Objectives of Warsaw
Only two years after Lindbergh made the first flight
across the Atlantic, legal scholars from around the world
met in Warsaw to prepare the law for a new era of interna-
tional aviation.3 6 Although intercontinental flying had
just begun, representatives of 23 countries 7 met on Octo-
ber 12, 1929, and established the Warsaw Convention, a
set of laws they hoped would provide the legal foundation
for all future international flights.3 8 The Convention was
guided by two objectives: (1) the development of a uni-
form system of law for international air carriers, 9 and (2)
the limitation of airline liability.4 °
The potential for uniformity in the realm of interna-
tional air transportation was an attractive feature of the
34 Id.; see infra notes 102-145 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 136-167.
'8 Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. LJ. 497, 498 (1967). The Warsaw Convention was organized because of
the realization that international air travel would create new legal questions for
which the law had yet to develop an answer. This need to accommodate the law
with growing technology prompted the statement at the opening of the conven-
tion that "what the engineers are doing for machines, we must do for the law." Id.
at 498; Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776, 1789 (1984).
37 The United States did not participate in the Warsaw Convention, composed
primarily of European nations, but did have an observer in attendance. S. SPEISER
& C. KRAUSE, 1 AvIATION TORT LAW § 11:4 (1978).
38 Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 499. The authors of the Warsaw
Convention were aware that the airline industry would undergo tremendous
changes that were unforseeable to them at that time, but they were determined to
provide a foundation on which amendments and new laws could be added. Id.
39 Id.
40 Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977); Day v. Trans World Airlines,
528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975) and Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386
F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967) all identify uniformity and limited liability as the two
primary objectives of the Warsaw Convention.
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Convention. 41 Not only would there be uniformity in tick-
ets, way bills, and the like, but international travelers
would be assured of a uniform set of laws to be used by
foreign jurisdictions.4 2 This would greatly simplify the
enormous potential that existed for conflicts of laws in
cases arising from international air travel.43
The concept of limiting the airline's liability and thus
restricting the recovery of an injured party stimulated
much debate,44 and was considered the most important of
the two objectives of the Convention.4 5 Supporters of
limited liability pointed to the early stages of development
which the airline industry was undergoing.4 6 They argued
that by limiting liability, insurance for airlines would be
less expensive and businessmen would be encouraged to
invest more capital in the growing industry.47 Opponents
of the liability limit objected to the concept of not al-
lowing a plaintiff the total damages that were due and ar-
gued that the airline industry should not be singled out
from other businesses to enjoy the privilege of limited
liability.4 s
In exchange for the benefit given to airlines by limiting
their liability, the drafters of the Convention shifted the
burden of proof in negligence actions to the airlines.49
41 Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 498. The uniformity aspect of
the Warsaw Convention was one of the motivating factors behind the United
States' adherence to the Convention. Id.
42 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 37, at § 11:4.
43 Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 498-99. Without the Warsaw
Convention, a court would be faced with chaotic conflicts between the laws of the
country in which the passenger was a citizen, the country in which the accident
occurred, the country in which the airline was incorporated, and the countries
from which the plane was to depart and arrive. Id.
- See id. at 504-09.
4- Id. at 499.
46 Id. at 498-99.
47 Id. at 494-500. At this time, airline accidents were much more common than
today, although there were fewer passengers in each plane. Id. at 498. Without a
limit to liability, it was argued that an airline disaster would force a developing
airline into bankruptcy. Id. See S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 37, at § 11:4.
48 Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 498-99.
49 Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 1967);
see also Warsaw Convention, supra note 11 at art. 20.
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Thus, making the airline prove lack of negligence im-
proved the ability of the passenger plaintiff to establish
liability. 50 With this compromise reached between the air-
lines and the passenger, the airline's liability was limited
to 125,000 Poincare francs per passenger ($8,300).51 De-
spite the criticisms that the liability limitation was either
too high or too low, 5 2 the Warsaw Convention was ratified
or adhered to by most of the world's industrial nations,
including the United States.53
As the airline industry grew, so did amounts recover-
able in domestic personal injury suits not regulated by the
Warsaw Convention.5 4 Soon the stronger economic na-
tions (United States, Great Britain, France) began seeking
an increase of the $8,300 limit to liability.55 Accordingly,
a conference was called at the Hague in 1955 to consider
a Protocol which would revise the Warsaw Convention. 6
The United States approached the Hague Conference
50 Block, 386 F.2d at 327.
51 S. SPEISER & C. KRA uSE, supra note 37 at § 11:36. The amount of recovery is
based on the gold standard and thus fluctuated, until recently, in its conversion to
the American dollar. For example, in 1974, the equivalent amount of recovery in
American dollars was closer to $10,000. Id. This fluctuation stopped, however,
when the United States went off the gold standard in 1978. Trans World Airlines
v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1776, 1781-82 (1984) (holding the 1978 repeal
of the Par Value Modification Act does not render the Warsaw Convention's cargo
liability limit unenforceable in the United States). Although the United States
went off the gold standard, the Civil Aeronautics Board still uses the last official
price of gold ($42.22 per ounce as established in 1972 Par Value Modification
Act) to translate the Warsaw Convention's cargo liability limit. Id. at 1781-84.
52 Even at this early stage of development, the differences in the economic
strengths of the participating nations created a delicate balance of the interests
between the high income nations and third world countries. Lowenfeld & Men-
dlesohn, supra note 36, at 504.
53 Id. at 502. The United States adhered to the Warsaw Convention on July 31,
1934, with little debate in Congress and the Convention was adopted in 49 Stat.
3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1982). Id.
5, Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 554. For example, from 1950-
1964, the average settlement per passenger fatality not regulated by the Warsaw
Convention was $38,499. In comparison, during the same period the average set-
tlement per passenger fatality subject to the Warsaw Convention was $6,489. Id.
5 Id. at 553-55. While the $8,300 limit was far below the level of average settle-
ments in the United States (which in 1955 was $19,945 for non-Warsaw fatalities),
id. at 554, it was still above the average settlement in lesser-developed nations.
Id.
56 Id. at 504.
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with a proposal to increase the limit of liability to
$25,000.57 As one basis of support for an increased limi-
tation, the United States complained that attorney fees in
this country were often awarded on a contingency basis,
being deducted from the limited judgment and greatly re-
ducing the plaintiffs' actual recovery. 8 , However, a
$25,000 limit was considered much too high by most
countries represented, and the delegates reduced the
limit to $16,600, double the original Warsaw amount. 9
To induce the United States' acceptance of this figure, the
delegates approved an amendment allowing attorney fees
to be awarded in addition to the limited judgment.60
The refusal of other nations to increase the liability
limit above $16,600 not only raised questions regarding
whether the United States should ratify what became
known as the Hague Protocol, 6' but also sparked serious
consideration of United States withdrawal from the War-
saw Convention altogether.6 2 Although the United States
enjoyed the uniformity of law and ticketing which the
Warsaw Convention offered,63 the liability limit of only
51 Id. at 506. Because of the outdated restraints on plaintiff recoveries imposed
by the Warsaw Convention, United States legislators were very interested in the
results of the Hague Conference. This attention was a dramatic change from the
low level of interest that was expressed during ratification of the original Warsaw
Convention. Id. at 510. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
5, Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 507-10. The United States found
itself as the only country suffering from this problem because all other countries
award attorney fees extraneous of the judgment and not on a contingency basis.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 507.
6 Id. at 508. Beaumont, The Warsaw Convention of 1929, As Amended by the Protocol
Signed at the Hague on September 28, 1955, 22J. AIR L. & CoM. 414, 418 (1955).
61 The modifications to the Warsaw Convention produced from the conference
at the Hague became known as the Hague Protocol. Beaumont, supra note 60 at
414; See S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 37, at § 11:18. Although the United
States officially became a party to the Protocol on June 28, 1956, the United States
Senate refused to ratify it. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir. 1977).
62 Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 510.
65 By this time, the Warsaw Convention was a well-recognized, long-standing
agreement that the United States wanted to avoid disapproving. The Kennedy
administration feared that such withdrawal would isolate the United States and
injure its reputation as well as its foreign diplomacy. Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn,
supra note 36, at 533-54.
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$16,600 still greatly undercompensated American plain-
tiffs. 64 Consequently, on November 15, 1965, the United
States announced its denunciation of the Convention,
although actual withdrawal would not officially become ef-
fective until six months later.65
The possibility of American withdrawal from the Con-
vention prompted another conference, this time in Mon-
treal, where those in attendance hoped a compromise
with the United States could be reached.66 The United
States was the country most active in international air traf-
fic, and it was feared the entire Warsaw Convention might
become meaningless and collapse if the United States
withdrew.67 The United States asked that the liability
limit be raised to no less than $100,000, but it failed to
gain the support of the other nations needed to effectuate
such a drastic change from $16,600.68 One day before the
denunciation was to become effective, a temporary com-
promise agreement was hastily reached in which airlines
flying to or from the United States agreed to waive the
liability limitation up to $75,000 and relinquish any de-
fenses they had available under the Warsaw Convention. 69
The practical effect of this agreement was to impose abso-
lute liability upon an airline 70 and to limit a plaintiff's re-
covery to $75,000, including attorney fees. 7 1 Although
- See supra note 55 and accompanying text. By 1964, the average settlement for
a non-Warsaw fatality was $76,652. Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at
554.
r5 Id. at 551. According to Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention, a six month
notice of denunciation or withdrawal is required. Warsaw Convention, supra note
11.
- Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 549-52.
67 Id. at 510, 514, 590.
- Id. at 563-75.
69 Id. at 586-96; S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 37, at § 11:19.
70 Under the original Warsaw Convention, although an airline had the burden
of proof in a negligence action, it was not held strictly liable. Warsaw Convention,
supra note 11, at arts. 18, 21. The feature of absolute liability and promise of
encouraging earlier dispositions of suits was added to induce United States ac-
ceptance of the $75,000 limit. Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 586-96.
Such a change had been earlier considered by the United States, but rejected by
the airline industry. Id.
71 Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 596-99. The earlier Hague Pro-
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intended as only a temporary measure, the Montreal
Agreement is still in effect in the United States today.
B. Application of the Warsaw Objectives
While one of the goals of the drafters of the Convention
was uniformity, the varying economic natures of the ad-
hering countries has made absolute uniformity impossi-
ble.73 The attempt to limit liability to a single monetary
amount has resulted in a total of three different agree-
ments, each with a different limitation. 74 Although differ-
ent monetary limits of recovery may apply in certain
instances, the Warsaw Convention is still the cornerstone
of all other issues regarding limited liability.75
A challenge for the courts has been application of the
Warsaw objectives of uniformity and limited liability to is-
tocol amendment allowing recovery of attorney fees in addition to the limited
judgment, see supra note 58 and accompanying text, was abolished and the attor-
ney fees were made a part of the larger $75,000 recovery. For those nations that
do not award attorney fees on a contingency basis, the limit agreed to was
$58,000. Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 37.
72 See O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 730 F.2d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 1984) (uphold-
ing the Montreal Agreements, $75,000 liability limit).
79 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. See generally Lowenfeld & Men-
dlesohn, supra note 36. Establishing a single dollar figure (based on the gold stan-
dard) to be used by all adhering nations, rich and poor, was perhaps too
optimistic a goal for the Convention. The limit set for liability has generated by
far the most controversy over the Warsaw Convention. Id.
74 Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36 at 596-601; see also supra notes 36-73
and accompanying text. Depending upon which country was a party to a suit, a
court could be faced with having to apply the Warsaw Convention limit of $8,300,
the Hague Protocol amended limit of $16,600, or the Montreal Agreement limit
of $75,000. Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn,'supra note 36 at 596-601. This situation
exists because some nations, having never signed the Hague Protocol or Montreal
Agreement, are still limited by the original Warsaw Convention amount. Id.
Other countries have agreed to the Hague Protocol, but not the Montreal Agree-
ment, and vice versa. Id. It should be noted that the Montreal Agreement is only
applicable to flights which have some connection with the United States such as
the place of departure or arrival. Id. See also S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note
37, at § 11:19.
75 Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 396 F. Supp. 95, 100 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(the Montreal Agreement could not and did not change the terms of the Warsaw
Convention, but rather was an agreement by the airlines to accept a higher limit of
liability and waive the defenses available under the Convention), rev'd on other
grounds, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977); see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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sues on which the Convention is silent. 76 In such in-
stances, the courts attempt to give the Convention as
uniform an application as possible, consistent with the
"genuine shared expectations of the contracting par-
ties."77 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals developed one
of the earliest guidelines for interpreting the Warsaw
Convention in the absence of a specific provision address-
ing the issue at bar.78 In Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France,79 the Atlanta Art Society chartered an Air France
plane for a flight to and from Paris.80 The plane crashed at
Orly Field in Paris, killing everyone aboard. 8' The plain-
tiffs argued that the Warsaw Convention was inapplicable
to "chartered" planes, thus leaving the Fifth Circuit to de-
termine, in the Convention's silence, whether to broaden
or restrict the scope of the Warsaw Convention.8 2 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that in interpreting the Warsaw
Convention it should inquire into (1) the circumstances
76 Block, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding the Warsaw Convention applica-
ble to private, chartered international flights). The United States Supreme Court
has heard only two cases requiring application of the Warsaw Convention. In the
first, a lower court held the Warsaw Convention not applicable to the crash of an
international flight because the passenger's ticket camouflaged or hid the limited
liability provisions required by the Convention so that the passenger had no ac-
tual warning that his flight was subject to limited liability. Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508, 514 (1966). On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed
in a divided opinion withJustice Marshall absent, and therefore did not publish an
opinion. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968). The case
which provides the most recent guidelines for application of the Warsaw Agree-
ment is Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1776, 1782 (1984)
(holding that the 1978 repeal of legislation setting an "official" price of gold in
the United States does not affect the enforceability of the Warsaw Convention's
cargo liability limit). With the Supreme Court giving little attention to the War-
saw Convention, a great majority of the interpretation has been left to the federal
courts of appeal. S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 37, at § 11:4.
77 S. SPEIsER & C. KRAUSE, supra note 37, at § 11:6; Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d
1079, 1090 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 468
(2d Cir. 1962), aff'd 373 U.S. 49 (1963)).
7s Block, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967). The court stated that "the determination
in an American court of the meaning of an international convention drawn by
continental jurists is hardly possible without considering the conception, parturi-
tion, and growth of the convention." id. at 336.
79 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967).
8o Id. at 324-25.
8I Id.
82 Id. at 325-26.
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under which the Convention was entered into, (2) the
subsequent application of the Convention, and (3) the
conditions existing at the time of the interpretation. 83
Thus, not only did the court recognize the current status
of the airline industry, but it also recognized that reliance
should be placed on the legislative history of the Warsaw
Convention. 4 Based upon these considerations, the
court extended the scope of the Warsaw Convention to
include "chartered" airlines and the plaintiffs' recovery
was limited to $8,300 each.85 In a dissenting opinion, one
of the justices opposed the court's interpretation of the
Warsaw Convention on public policy 86 grounds. Such
public policy, the justice argued, is the basis for a rule in
the United States that, if different meanings can be placed
upon a treaty, the one adopted should be that which is
least restrictive of the rights of individuals.
In 1977, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was asked
to interpret the silences of the Warsaw Convention in Reed
v. Wiser.88 Reed involved damage claims arising from a
bomb explosion on a Trans World Airline (TWA) air-
craft.8 9 The next of kin and representatives of the passen-
gers killed brought a cause of action against the employees
of TWA, as well as the TWA corporation itself. The
plaintiffs in Reed claimed the employees of TWA were per-
sonally negligent in maintaining security.90 The court
considered the issue of whether the Convention limited
the liability of airline employees as well as the liability of
the airline corporation.9' The court began its analysis by
as Id. at 337.
84 Id. at 336-48. The Fifth Circuit cited the United States Supreme Court opin-
ion of Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943), which
stated that treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements and that
courts must look beyond the written word to the history of the treaty. Block, 386
F.2d at 337.
85 Block, 386 F.2d at 353.
86 Id. at 354.
87 Id.
88 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
89 Id.
- Id. at 1081.
91 Id.
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looking to the official French text of the Convention and
to the plain meaning of the words.92 In the absence of an
express provision in the convention addressing the issue,
and following the analysis used in Block, the court then
reviewed the legislative history of the Convention.93 The
court found that the purpose of the Warsaw Convention
was to develop a uniform set of world-wide liability rules
to govern air transportation. 94 In addition, the court con-
sidered the long-term effect of its interpretation on the
objectives of the Convention.9 5 Based on this analysis,
the court concluded that employees as well as airline cor-
porations were entitled to enjoy the limited liability pro-
tections of the Warsaw Convention.9 6
In its review of the legislative history of the provision of
the Convention limiting liability to $8,300, the Second
Circuit issued the strongest proclamation to date that the
limit should be strictly adhered to, stating: "[i]t is beyond
92 Id. at 1082-85. The court stated that if the provision's language accurately
reflects the Convention's purpose, the literal meaning of the words should be
strictly adhered to. However, if the words do not completely manifest the pur-
pose, then a more liberal reading is required. Id.
93 Id. at 1088. The Second Circuit stated that "[a] court faced with this problem
of interpretation. . . can well begin with an inquiry into the purpose of the provi-
sion that requires interpretation. The language of the provision that is to be in-
terpreted is, of course, highly relevant to this inquiry, but it should never become
a verbal prison." Id. (quoting Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 360 F.2d 804, 812 (2d
Cir. 1966)).
- Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1090. The court stated that "[a]nother funda-
mental purpose of the signatories [the other purpose being to limit liability] to the
Warsaw Convention, which is entitled to great weight in interpreting that pact,
was their desire to establish a uniform body of world-wide liability rules to govern
international aviation." Id.
Id.
o Id at 1093. The courts in both Block and Reed were called upon to make the
most extreme extrapolations of the Warsaw Convention. Their line of interpre-
tive analysis has been followed by many other jurisdictions. See Evangelinos v.
Trans World Airlines, 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (holding the Warsaw Con-
vention inapplicable to passengers injured while waiting in line to proceed to the
last gate of the airline terminal); Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31 (2d.
Cir. 1975) (holding the Warsaw Convention applicable to passengers waiting in
airport area exclusively reserved for those about to board international flights);
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding
the Warsaw Convention inclusive of mental injuries and holding airlines liable for
injuries included in the Warsaw Convention regardless of their ultimate cause).
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dispute that the purpose of the liability limitation pre-
scribed by Article 22 was to fix at a definite level the cost to
airlines of damages sustained by their passengers and of
insurance to cover such damages. ' 97 Furthermore, the
court stated that "at no time has this country ever aban-
doned the basic principle that, whatever the limits may be,
air carriers should be protected from having to pay more
than a fixed and definite sum for passenger injuries sus-
tained in international air disasters. ' 98  On the basis of
this rationale, the court held the plaintiffs recovery
against the airline employees, as well as the corporation
itself, was limited by the Warsaw Convention. 99
In summary, the Warsaw Convention goals of uniform-
ity and limited liability serve as guidelines for judicial in-
terpretations of the treaty. 00 Those cases in which the
text of the Warsaw Convention is of little aid are decided
primarily on the basis of the analysis developed in Block
and subsequently applied in Reed.'' The circumstances
under which the Convention was drafted, the Conven-
tion's subsequent applications, and existing conditions
surrounding the issue at bar are all factors considered by
the courts.10 2
C. Principles Underlying Awards of Pre-Judgment and Post-
Judgment Interest
The theory of fully compensating wronged parties for
97 Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1089 (emphasis in original). This language has
been criticized as dictum because the issue before the court was the applicability
of the liability limitation to employees of an airline corporation and not the
amount of such liability. Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir.
1984).
9 Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1089. The court noted that the only exception to
the airline paying a fixed sum would be willful misconduct by the airline, which
would not entitle it to the protections of the Warsaw Convention. Id. See also
Warsaw Convention, supra note 11, at art. 25.
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d at 1093.
,o See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the applica-
tion of the Warsaw objectives.
10, Id.
102 See supra note 83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Block ap-
proach to interpreting the Warsaw Convention.
391
392 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [50
the injuries they have suffered led to the concepts of pre-
judgment and post-judgment interest. Interest in the legal
sense has been defined as "compensation allowed by law
for the use or forbearance or detention of money."'
0 3
The time at which interest should begin to accrue, before
the judgment or after, is either a discretionary matter for
the court or a matter of right to the parties. 04
Because a court's judgment represents both a finding of
liability and of damages owed, there has been little dis-
pute in non-Warsaw cases regarding the award of interest
from the date of judgment until payment is made. 0 5 A
,os TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01a (Vernon 1976).
104 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 190 (1965). Post-judgment interest in federal
cases is required by law and is therefore a matter of right for the plaintiff. 28
U.S.C. § 1961 (1982). Pre-judgment interest, unless required by statute as in
Louisiana (IA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4203 (West 1968) (legal interest attaches
from the date ofjudicial demand in actions ex delicto), Probst v. Wroten, 433 So.
2d 734, 744 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (awarding interest pursuant to Louisiana statu-
tory law from date of judicial demand in action resulting from two automobile
accidents); Vallee v. Hyatt Corp., 433 So.2d 1070, 1075 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (hold-
ing the theft of a car while under the negligent control of hotel sounds in tort and
thus pre-judgment interest is awarded from date ofjudical demand according to
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4203 (West 1968)) is generally a matter within the dis-
cretion of the courts. See, e.g., Navajo Tribe v. Bank of New Mexico, 700 F.2d
1285, 1290 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding the award of pre-judgment interest is a
question of law soley within the sound discretion of the court); Cavic v. Grand
Bahama Development Co., 701 F.2d 879, 888 (11 th Cir. 1982) (upholding the
trial court judge's decision not to allow the jury to consider pre-judgment interest
because of the uncertainty of plaintiff's damages); Marshall v. Burger King Corp.,
509 F. Supp. 353, 355 (C.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding federal courts are authorized to
award pre-judgment interest as part of their equitable powers for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938). But see, Union Bank of Benton v. First Nat'l
Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 677 F.2d 1074, 1076 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing as the well-
settled rule in Texas that interest is recoverable as a matter of right to the parties
from the date of injury where damages are established as of a definite time and the
amount is definitely ascertainable). In admiralty cases, pre-judgment interest is
the rule rather than the exception, but the trial court maintains the discretion to
deny pre-judgment interest in "peculiar circumstances" that would make the
award inequitable. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Service, Inc., 674 F.2d 401,
414 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding no "peculiar circumstances" in the record to justify
the trial court's withholding of pre-judgment interest and thus remanding the case
to the trial court to award such interest); Masters v. Transworld Drilling Co., 688
F.2d 1013, 1014 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that pre-judgment interest is well-nigh
automatic in admiralty suits).
,05 Reeves v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 705 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that post-judgment interest does accrue on award of wages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1976, although prejudgment interest does not); see
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judgment clearly establishes a debt between parties and
thus post-judgment interest provides compensation for
the detention of money lawfully belonging to the party
for whom judgment was rendered. 10 6 Indeed, Congress
has passed legislation requiring the award of post-judg-
ment interest in federal civil cases.10 7
The awarding of pre-judgment interest has presented a
more difficult problem. 10 8 In deciding whether to impose
pre-judgment interest, courts originally drew a distinction
between contract cases, in which the damages are more
likely to be liquidated, and tort actions, in which damages
sought are usually unliquidated.'0 9 Courts have consid-
ered it an undue hardship to require a party to pay inter-
est on an unliquidated debt because both liability and
also 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982). Most of the controversy surrounding awards of
post-judgment interest concerns defining "final judgment". Gele v. Wilson, 616
F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that post-judgment interest begins accru-
ing on an appealed case only after the case has been remanded or modified and a
final judgment rendered, rather than on the date of the original trial court judg-
ment); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 701 F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir.
1983) (awarding interst on attorney's fees and costs because the court felt it would
more nearly compensate the victor for the expense of litigation).
1- United States v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 450 F.2d 875 (1st Cir.
1971) (awarding interest from the date of the original judgment against a shipper
held liable for knowingly receiving an illegal rebate); Reeves v. International Tel.
& Tel. Corp., 705 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that post-judgment in-
terest does accrue on award of wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1976,
although pre-judgment interest does not).
107 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982) provides that:
Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case re-
covered in a district court. Execution therefore may be levied by the
marshal, in any case where by the law of the state in which such court
is held, execution may be levied for interest on judgments recovered
in the courts of the state. Such interest shall be calculated from the
date of the entry of the judgment, at the rate allowed by state law.
Id.
1o8 See infra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
1- See Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 856 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (holding that neither the common law nor the District of Columbia Code
provides for the award of pre-judgment interest in tort actions); Peterson v.
Crown Financial Corp., 661 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that it is clear in
contract actions that pre-judgment interest is properly awarded at the legal rate
while in tort cases, pre-judgment interest is not allowable as a matter of law,
although the courts may award compensation for delay).
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amount have yet to be established."' Because of this
threatened hardship the common law rule does not allow
pre-judgment interest on unliquidated tort claims."' As a
practical consequence, this rule envelops nearly all per-
sonal injury cases."t 2  Plaintiffs wishing to recover pre-
judgment interest in a personal injury case have at-
tempted to avoid the common law rule by disguising their
unliquidated claims as liquidated." 3 Furthermore, many
courts make exceptions to the common law rule and allow
pre-judgment interest provided the damages at the time
of the injury are ascertainable by computation or refer-
ence to an established market value, even though the
damages may still be termed "unliquidated"." 4
'to See Oliver-Elec. Mfg. v. 1.0. Teigen Constr., 183 F. Supp. 768, 769 (D. Minn.
1965) ("As to such claims, the general rule is that interest is not allowed as a part
of the damages because the party liable cannot establish the amount of his liability
and therefore should not be held in default for nonpayment.").
I See supra note 109 and accompanying text; Hare and Meelheim, Preudment
Interest in Personal Injury Litigation: A Policy of Fairness, 5 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 81, 84
(1981) (making the argument that pre-judgment interest should be allowed in tort
cases to the same extent as in contract cases).
112 Id.
,1 See, e.g., Busik v. Levine, 63 NJ. 351, 307 A.2d 571, 575 (1973). To avoid
the common law rule, plaintiffs have strained the concept of a "liquidated" sum by
arguing that at the time of the tort the damages were established and all injuries
sustained so that a defendant was on notice of the probable amount he would be
owing. Id. See also Broward County v. Sattler, 400 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (stating that a claim is only unliquidated for purposes of pre-judgment
interest when the amount of damages cannot be computed except on conflicting
evidence, inferences, and interpretations); Cavic v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co., 701
F.2d 879, 888 (11 th Cir. 1983) (upholding the trial court's refusal to award pre-
judgment interest where there existed a genuine dispute between the parties as to
the right of recovery and amount of damages).
114 See, e.g., Union Bank of Benton v. First Nat'l Bank in Mt. Pleasant, 677 F.2d
1074, 1079 (5th Cir. 1982) (awarding pre-judgment interest in action resulting
from bank's failure to timely return checks received from another bank);J.M. Hol-
lis Constr. Co. v. Paul Durham Co., 641 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. App. - Corpus
Christi 1982, no writ) (upholding award of pre-judgment interest to subcontractor
in construction contract action); E.M. Melahn Constr. Co. v. Village of Carpenter-
sville, 427 N.E.2d 181, 187 (Il1. App. Ct. 1981) (allowing pre-judgment interest on
recovery by contractor for extra work performed under roadway and sewer con-
tract because the amount due was ascertainable and subject to computation);
Price v. Amoco Oil Co., 524 F.Supp. 364, 372 (S.D. Ind. 1981) (awarding pre-
judgment interest in action arising from a personal injury and protected by an
indemnity agreement). Oliver-Elec. Mfg. Co. v. 1.0. Teiger Constr. Co., 183 F.
Supp. 768, 769 (D. Minn. 1965) (awarding interest on basis of court's discretion
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The theory that the defendant has been enjoying the
free use of money, which in accord with the ensuing judg-
ment rightfully belongs to the plaintiff, has formed the ba-
sis for awards of pre-judgment interest by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in a wide variety of cases." 5 In Whiting
v. Jackson State University 1 6 the Fifth Circuit held that mi-
norities were being discriminately discharged from their
jobs." 17 In awarding the plaintiff employees their back pay
as damages incurred, the Fifth Circuit also allowed inter-
est on that back pay because it was money owed to the
plaintiffs that was benefitting the defendant employer."
18
despite claim for unliquidated damages). An example of the broadening use of
pre-judgment interest for both liquidated and unliquidated damages is the Texas
case of McDaniel v. Tucker, 520 S.W. 2d 543 (Tex Civ. App. - - Corpus Christi
1975, no writ). Although in McDaniel, the contractor's cause of action was for
breach of contract (and alternatively for recovery in quantum meruit), id. at 546,
the state court of appeals stated that pre-judgment interest is allowed as damages
upon unliquidated demands, whether they arise out of an action for breach of
contract or tort. Id. at 543. The court held that if the measure of recovery is fixed
by the conditions existing at the time of the injury, interest should be awarded
from that time until judgment, regardless of whether the amount of damages is
fixed. Id at 549.
A rule adopted by the NewJersey Supreme Court imposing pre-judgment inter-
est in tort actions was challenged in Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571
(1973), as representing a matter of "substantive" law, and thus beyond the scope
of the rule-making authority of the court. 307 A.2d at 573. The New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the rule as a valid exercise of its power to establish proce-
dural rules. The court reasoned that "interest" represents "damages" for delay in
payment; "damages", in turn is considered a "remedy", and a "remedy" is a pro-
cedural matter within the court's power. Id. at 580. The court added that interest
is not punitive, but rather compensatory to indemnify the claimant for the loss of
the money he would have earned had payment not been delayed. Id. at 575. The
court concluded by abolishing any distinction between liquidated and unliqui-
dated claims, saying: "[i]t has been recognized that a distinction . . . simply as
between cases of liquidated and unliquidated damages is not a sound one." Id. at
575 (citing Funkhouser v. J.B. Preston Co, 290 U.S. 163, 168 (1933)). The court
reasoned that in both situations, the defendant and not the plaintiff has had the
use of monies which the eventual judgment finds the plaintiff is due. Busik v.
Levine, 307 A.2d at 575.
,15 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984); Whiting v.
Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ad-
ams, 513 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1975); National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th
Cir. 1959).
-, 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980).
,17 Id. at 123-24.
I'l Id. at 127, n. 8.
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In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams," 9 the defendant utility
company had collected "suspense money" 20 from its cus-
tomers based on a pending rate increase that subse-
quently failed.' 2' The Fifth Circuit charged interest on
the "suspense money" from the time it was collected from
the customers until the day Phillips tendered the funds
into the registry of the court. 122 The court additionally
held that once a defendant makes an unconditional offer
to give up the disputed funds, interest liability ceases. 23
Nearly 25 years prior to Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 12 4
the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether to award
pre-judgment interest as a part of damages regulated by
statute. 25  In National Airlines v. Stiles, 126 the plaintiff's
damages were limited by the Death on the High Seas Act
to "fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sus-
tained."'' 27 Thus, in order to insure that the injured party
was fully and fairly compensated for its loss, pre-judgment
interest was allowed as part of the damages.' 28 The Fifth
Circuit, quoting the United States Supreme Court, stated
that "[d]amage is sustained as of a certain date. What the
119 513 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1975).
120 "Suspense money" is that money collected by a utility from customers who
have been charged a higher rate that has yet to be approved by the regulating
authorities. If the rate increase is approved, the money has already been col-
lected, but if it is not approved, the utility owes its customers a partial refund.
Such a procedure is usually used for accounting purposes. Id. at 360.
121 Id. at 369.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 370.
124 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984).
125 National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 402. The Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976) states in
part:
the recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is
brought and shall be apportioned among them by the court in pro-
portion to the loss they may severally have suffered by reason of the
death of the person by whose representive the suit is brought.
46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976) (emphasis added).
128 National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d at 405. Interest on an award of the
$250,000 was calculated beginning with the date the plaintiffs husband was killed.
Id. at 402.
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damage is may not be and is not affected by the time when
estimated, but the damage is as found, and an award made
on one date is not the equivalent of an award made at an
earlier date."' 29 The court further stated that a party suf-
fering a financial loss from the death of a bread winner
can only be placed in the same position he or she previ-
ously enjoyed if the award is made at the time of the loss
or if interest for the interim between payment is al-
lowed.1 30 The dissenting judge, on the other hand, dis-
agreed on the basis that the interest award was contrary to
the well-recognized common law rule that "judgments for
unliquidated damages do not carry interest prior to their
rendition."' 3'1
The dissolution of the distinction between unliquidated
and liquidated damages in determining whether to award
pre-judgment interest and the broadening use of pre-
judgment interest has been motivated by two common
objectives: (1) the desire to avoid dilatory tactics, and (2)
the encouragement of early out-of-court settlements. 32
Opponents of pre-judgment interest argue that a plain-
tiffs unreasonable rejection of a settlement offer or pur-
poseful delay at trial make the award of interest
inequitable. 33 In response to this argument, awards of
pre-judgment interest are generally left to the discretion
of the trial court.3 4 Considerations such as who caused
the delay and the elapsed time between the injury and fi-
12 Id. at 405 quoting The Manhatten, 85 F.2d 427, 429 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
United States v. The Bessemer, 300 U.S. 654 (1936).
13o Id.
1-1 Id. at 408.
132 Busik v. Levine, 307 A.2d at 575-76. See also McDaniel v. Tucker, 520
S.W.2d 543, 549 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi 1975, no writ) (for a discus-
sion of these cases see supra note 114 and accompanying text).
,3 Busik v. Levine, 307 A.2d at 589.
13 22 AM.JuR. 2D Damages § 192 (1965). In some states, such as Louisiana, pre-
judgment interest awards are regulated by statute. See supra note 104 and accom-
panying text. In admiralty law, awards of pre-judgment interest on unliquidated
claims lie within the discretion of the court. See United States v. M/V Zoe Coloco-
troni, 602 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1979).
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nal judgment guide the court's decision.' 35
II. DOMANGUE V. EASTERN AIRLINES
The crash of Eastern Flight 66, and the ensuing litiga-
tion which lasted for more than six years, brought to issue
the application of the liability limitation of the Warsaw
Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, and
the award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.
The Fifth Circuit, in approaching the issue, followed the
interpretive analysis of the Warsaw Convention estab-
lished in Block and Reed.' 36 The court noted in reviewing
the legislative history of the Convention that the goal of
limiting liability was to protect the infant airline industry
and reduce insurance costs and passenger fares. 13 7 The
court stated that as early as 1955 at the Hague, the United
States expressed its discontent with the liability limitation
and its desire for more substantial recoveries for injured
plaintiffs. 13 8 In the court's view, the Montreal Agreement
which followed achieved two objectives: (1) an increase in
liability and (2) encouragement of speedy disposition of
claims.139
The court found that encouragement of early settle-
ments was an "important additional American objective"
of the Montreal Convention. 140 The court cited United
States co-sponsorship of the proposal to impose absolute
liability on the airlines as support for this conclusion.' 4 '
The court noted that the United States argued that elimi-
nating fault in establishing liability would expedite and re-
duce litigation costs because settlement negotiations
would not have to be delayed until the completion of acci-
,3- Busik v. Levine, 307 A.2d at 589-90; Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d
256 (5th Cir. 1984).
-56 See supra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
137 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 261.
,38 Id.
19 See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text; Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn,
supra note 36, at 507-09, 570-71, 593, 600.
140 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 261.
141 Id; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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dent investigations. 42 Having concluded that a motivat-
ing objective of the Montreal Convention was to expedite
the disposition of claims, the court was able to find that
the award of interest was in accord with the objectives of
the Convention.
43
The Fifth Circuit also found support for its decision to
award interest by citing to the eventual treatment of attor-
ney fees by the Montreal Agreement as a separate and dis-
tinct cost from damages. The court stated that interest in
America is often awarded in addition to and distinct from
a damages judgment. 144 The court concluded that be-
cause the Warsaw drafters failed to comprehend that at-
torney fees in the United States were awarded as a part of
the final judgment, it must also have failed to comprehend
how American courts award interest.'45 In the court's
opinion, the silence of the Convention indicates that in-
terest is allowed in addition to the limited liability. 146 For,
as the court stated, "if the drafters of the Montreal Agree-
ment had wanted interest to be included within the
$75,000 limitation, they could have so stipulated."' 14 7
142 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 261; see supra note 139 and ac-
companying text.
143 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 263. The court, by finding con-
sistency in the objectives of interest and the Warsaw Convention, stated that
awarding interest in this case would "well serve" the objectives of the Warsaw
Convention. Id. at 262.
144 Id. at 262. The court reasoned that because an amendment allowing attor-
ney fees in addition to the limited recovery under the Warsaw Convention was at
one time adopted, it signified that silence by the original drafters as to attorney
fees meant attorney fees were not to be included in the amount specified. Id.
145 Id. The court argues that the limit on liability is purely to reflect compensa-
tory damages, and that when it was learned that attorney fees were coming out of
that amount, the limit was increased to accommodate those fees. Id. at 262.
Under the same reasoning, the ceiling on liability must not include interest be-
cause of the accepted American practice of awarding interest distinct from the
normal damages. Id.
146 Id. The district court in Domangue held that the silence of the Convention
meant interest was to be included in the limited amount and, in the court's opin-
ion, if the drafters of the Convention had intended to award interest separately in
addition to the limit, they would have so specified. Domangue v. Eastern Airlines,
542 F. Supp. at 654: The district court viewed interest as an element of damages
and because the Convention specifically limited "damages," any interest above
the $75,000 limit would not be allowed. Id.
147 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 262.
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The court, identifying post-judgment interest as a "rel-
atively routine policy," found the objectives of the War-
saw Convention well served by allowing such a claim.148
The court cited three basic reasons for its decision: (1)
post-judgment interest is easily calculable and places a de-
fendant on notice of what he owes; (2) the goal of main-
taining a definite level of liability will still be maintained
because interest is so easily calculable; and (3) the amount
of interest owed is entirely within the control of the airline
because the airline determines how long it will withhold
payment following a judgment.' 49 Because the airline has
control of the post-judgment interest liability it will incur,
the court concluded that the airline cannot complain that
its level of liability is being artificially inflated.15 0
The court began analyzing the issue whether to allow
pre-judgment interest by noting that because the Warsaw
Convention is uniform law, state statutes and common
law are not binding.' 5 ' Nevertheless, the court cited cases
which make exceptions to the common law rule of not al-
lowing pre-judgment interest on unliquidated claims. 52
The court also cited cases from its own bench in which
pre-judgment interest was allowed.' 53 Referring to the
discrimination cases such as Whiting v. Jackson State Univer-
sity' 54 and the "suspense" money case of Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Adams,15 5 the Fifth Circuit emphasized that pre-
judgment interest should be awarded because the defend-
ant should not be able to use someone else's money for
years and then pay nothing for such use. 156
The Fifth Circuit found the strongest support for its
holding by analogizing to its reasoning in National Airlines
148 Id; see also supra notes 102-135 and accompanying text.
149 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 262.
150 Id.
15, Id. at 262-63.
1 Id. at 263 (citing cases discussed supra notes 102-135 and accompanying
text).
'" Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 263.
' 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980).
' 513 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1975).
"' Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 263.
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v. Stiles in which the court awarded pre-judgment interest
although the damages were limited by statute.' 5 7 The
court reasoned that the objectives of fully compensating
the injured party were the same under both the Death on
the High Seas Act and the Warsaw Convention.' 58 The
Fifth Circuit rejected the lower court's argument that the
goal of the Convention was to place a ceiling on the
amount of damages recoverable rather than attempt to
fully compensate an injured party. 59
Based upon its analysis of the preceding authorities, the
court held that awarding pre-judgment interest is within
the discretion of the court and thus permissible under the
Warsaw Convention.16 0 Admitting that its decision was
influenced by the "inequity of Eastern Airlines' benefiting
from the delay between the crash and a final judgment" (6
1/2 years),' 6' the court established discretionary guide-
lines for determining whether to allow interest. 6 2 The
Fifth Circuit included in its guidelines consideration of
the length of time between the tort and final judgment,
and whether the defendant caused or contributed to the
delay. 63
The Fifth Circuit balanced the objectives of the Warsaw
Convention with the objectives of post-judgment and pre-
judgment interest and found them consistent. 64  The
court stated that its decision did not defeat the objective
of limiting liability because the amount of interest to be
paid would depend on whether airlines avoid disposing of
157 National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 1959).
158 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 263.
"5 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 542 F. Supp. at 654.
Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 262-64.
16, Id. at 264.
162 Id. Although the Domangue lawsuit lasted for six and one half years, it
should be noted that part of the delay was due to the change in assertion by the
plaintiff, Mrs. Domangue, as to the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to her
case. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
163 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 264. By letting the court award
interest in its discretion based upon the circumstances surrounding each case,
both the plaintiff and defendant are encouraged to avoid dilatory tactics. Id.
1- Id. at 262-64.
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their claims.' 65 The court opined that its decision would
not result in higher insurance rates for the airline industry
because airlines have the ability to keep interest on a
judgment to a minimum. 166
III. CONCLUSION
The United States' discontent with the liability limita-
tion of the Warsaw Convention continues with the Fifth
Circuit holding in Domangue v. Eastern Airlines.167 The de-
cision, in light of a subsequent contrary holding involving
the same incident, 168 adds yet more confusion to an
agreement premised upon a goal of establishing uniform-
ity. 169 Although the Fifth Circuit presented substantive
authority for the idea of awarding pre-judgment interest
on unliquidated tort claims, the relevance of its authority
to the Warsaw Convention is highly questionable. 7 ° The
Court was forced to refer to cases involving discrimina-
tion, utilities, and admiralty, and to conclude from those
that pre-judgment interest is also proper under the War-
saw Convention.' 7' It is difficult to understand (and the
court makes no attempt to explain) the relevance between
the cases cited and the Warsaw Convention. 72
The court was only able to reconcile the award of inter-
est by claiming it furthers the goals of the Warsaw Con-
1- id. at 264.
1W66 Id.
167 id. at 263.
- O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines, 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the
Warsaw Convention does not allow pre-judgment and post-judgment interest
above the $75,000 liability limitation).
169 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
17o Authority cited by the court for the proposition of awarding pre-judgment
interest included: McDaniel v. Tucker, 520 S.W. 2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus
Christi 1975, no writ); Whiting v.Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.
1980); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1975); National
Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959) (for a discussion of these cases see
supra notes 114-131 and accompanying text).
171 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 262; see supra note 170 and ac-
companying text.
172 Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 262.
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vention as modified by the Montreal Agreement.17 3 The
court viewed United States acceptance of the absolute lia-
bility provision in the Montreal Agreement as indicative
of the "important American objective" to provide speedy
compensation to injured parties. 174  The Fifth Circuit
failed to note that the Montreal drafters offered absolute
liability to the United States as an inducement for lower-
ing the liability limit from $100,000 to $75,000, and that
the United States adopted the offer in haste. 175 Because
the proposed liability limit was lowered by $25,000 to ac-
count for the speedy compensation to injured parties
which absolute liability would bring, it could be argued
that the principles for awarding interest have already been
accommodated. 76 Thus, it appears as if delays in plaintiff
recoveries are considered, and are a part of the Montreal
Agreement. '77
Another questionable identification of Warsaw goals
arose in the court's treatment of National Airlines v.
Stiles.' 78 Damages are limited in that case by the Death on
the High Seas Act to "fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary loss sustained.' 7 9  The court in Domangue
found such a limitation consistent with the objectives of
the Warsaw Convention in its regulation of damages.8 0
Finding such a consistency seems "strained" when (1) the
"7 Id. at 262-63.
174 Id. at 261; The only authority the court cited for identifying "speedy com-
pensation" as an important goal of the United States was certain sections of
Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 507-09, 570-71, 593, 600; see
Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 261.
175 Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 36, at 586-601; see supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
176 Without absolute liability, a plaintiff's recovery commonly takes longer; the
plaintiff does not have the benefit of earning interest on money he would have had
earlier with the imposition of absolute liability. Therefore, if he receives his
money later due to a longer trial he should recover more money ($100,000) than
if he had the advantage of a quicker trial and a smaller award ($75,000) that could
begin earning interest earlier.
177 See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
178 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959); see supra notes 124-131 and accompanying
text.
179 National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d at 402 n. 2.
,so Domangue v. Eastern Airlines, 722 F.2d at 263.
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Warsaw Convention places a definite monetary figure as a
limit whereas the Death on the High Seas Act does not,
and (2) the court, earlier in its opinion, recognized that
victims of air disasters are only able to recover a propor-
tion of their actual damages under the Warsaw Conven-
tion, whereas the Death on the High Seas Act provides for
compensation commensurate to the loss sustained.
81
Based, in part, upon these criticisms of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the Warsaw and Montreal Agree-
ment, Domangue was not followed by the Second Circuit in
a subsequent suit arising out of the same incident. In
O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines,18 2 the Second Circuit stated in
direct opposition to Domangue that "speedy resolution of
claims was apparently not an important United States ob-
jective at the Montreal conference."' 183 The Second Cir-
cuit, citing many of the same cases as relied on in
Domangue, found no intent of the Warsaw contracting par-
ties to deviate from the established limit and award any-
thing above it.' 8 4
18, Id. at 261. In National Airlines v. Stiles, the Fifth Circuit awarded pre-judg-
ment interest on the basis that the plaintiff would not be receiving the full value of
her "pecuniary loss" (as required by the Death on the High Seas Act) if she was
not compensated for the time between the loss and payment. 268 F.2d at 500.
The Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement, on the other hand, limit dam-
ages to a specific amount which has been acknowledged as not fully compensating
the plaintiff. Domangue, 722 F.2d at 261. See also supra note 97 and accompanying
text (discussing the statement in Reed that the purpose of the liability limitation of
the Warsaw Convention is to limit the cost to airlines). While the Fifth Circuit
under the mandate of the Death on the High Seas Act had an obligation to fully
compensate the plaintiff, that obligation is specifically limited in the Warsaw Con-
vention and Montreal Agreement. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the $75,000 liability limit.)
182 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 854 n. 20. The court stated that the absolute liability provision was not
a prime objective of the United States and that it was introduced as a "means of
getting the United States to accept a liability limit lower than $100,000." Id. (cit-
ing Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 36, at 563, 570-71.)
184 O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines, 730 F.2d at 853, citing Reed v. Wiser and
Compagnie v. Nationale Air France as examples of the court strictly adhering to
the Convention. The Second Circuit recognized the Warsaw Convention as the
supreme law of the land and stated that it had a duty to interpret it according to
the intent of the framers. 730 F.2d at 853. In the absence of a specific provision
in the Warsaw Convention allowing pre-judgment interest, the court concluded it
must not be allowed because if the signatories had meant to exclude interest from
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The Domangue decision, now standing in conflict with
O'Rourke, dictates a need for action. A final interpretation
as to interest and the $75,000 limitation by the United
States Supreme Court would clarify matters, but Warsaw
plaintiffs would continue to be grossly undercompensated
in comparison to non-Warsaw plaintiffs. Amending the
Warsaw Convention or withdrawing from its guise alto-
gether must once again seriously be considered.
Kelly M. Crawford
the limited damages, they would have included a specific provision in the treaty.
Id.
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